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This study focused on the conflicts that are faced by directors appointed by BEE-
shareholders to the board of directors of a company. The focus of the study was on the 
conflict that arises when the expectations of the BEE-shareholder that appoints these 
directors are not in line with the duties imposed upon these directors by law. The study 
considered whether these directors are there to act as agents of the BEE-shareholder that 
had appointed them and how autonomous are these directors in the performance of their 
duties. The main aim of this study was to establish a standard prescribed by law that is 
expected of these directors and to consider the expectations of the general public as to 
what is expected of these directors. The purpose of the study was to establish whether a 
conflict does exist and to get an understanding of the nature of the conflict. The outcome 
of the study would be to develop recommendations as to how to best address the conflict. 
The research study contained both quantitative and qualitative enquires. Data was 
collected by means of a questionnaire. The sampling technique that was used was 
“accidental or availability non-probability sampling”. Due to time constraints and limited 
resources, the study could not be conducted on a representative sample as the respondents 
were predominantly from the Durban Metropolitan area and Bizana in the Eastern Cape 
Province. The study revealed that predominantly the respondents agree with the 
prescriptions of law that BEE-representative directors owe a fiduciary duty to the 
company. The study revealed that the respondents also agreed with the legal standpoint 
that these directors should prioritise the interests of the company before any other 
interests including the interests of the BEE shareholders whom they represent. However, 
the majority of the respondents also believed that BEE shareholders had the right to 
instruct these directors how they must discharge their duties as directors and these 
directors were accountable to the BEE shareholders. The study revealed that there was a 
disparity between the expectations of BEE shareholders and the provisions of law, as 
most of the respondents were BEE Beneficiaries thus being part of a BEE shareholder. 
From the findings of the study, a corporate governance policy on this issue was 
formulated as part of the objectives of the study. Another recommendation was for a 
further study to be conducted to better understand the disparities identified in this study in 
order to formulate a solution for that problem.   
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Even though the issue of corporate governance had already come under consideration in 
the 1990s, the emphasis has significantly increased since 2001. The collapse of 
international conglomerates such as Enron and Arthur Anderson has brought about a 
climate of extreme consciousness regarding the governance of companies from a variety 
of commentating perspectives.  
 
The establishment of a decent level of governance ethic, themed on integrity, 
accountability and transparency of company board of directors has become the area of 
concern for policy makers all over the world. Apart from the general corporate 
governance issues mentioned that are of concern in all markets, each country has its own 
dynamics that contribute to its own economic culture, and which are unique to its 
environment.  South Africa has an additional unique dimension to corporate governance 
shaped by the country’s past. In an attempt to establish the corporate governance 
standards applicable in South Africa, one has to take into account the country’s history 
within the context of the corporate governance direction followed today. 
 
The introduction of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa has added 
another dimension to the corporate governance standards observed in the country. This 
study will focus on directors who are appointed by BEE shareholders to be members of a 
board in a representative capacity. The study will also seek to establish to whom these 
directors owe allegiance in terms of performing their duties and responsibilities.  
 
This study will also consider the factors to which these directors might be exposed, and 
the expectations of the BEE shareholders they represent. In order for this to be 
established, all the sources and factors that might dictate the duties and responsibilities of  
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these directors and any other factors that might influence them in this regard, need to be 
understood.   
 
This study aims to establish whether it is possible for directors who represent these BEE 
shareholders to discharge their duties as directors to the company in an unfettered manner 
in accordance with applicable laws and practice standards observed in South Africa. The 
aim is to establish the prescriptions of our laws, policies and practices and establish their 
application in practice within the context of the South African dynamics. The study also 
aims to establish whether there is any diversion from these prescriptions and hopefully 
make recommendations to move forward.  
 
1.2   Background 
The introduction of Apartheid in South Africa when the National Party came into power 
in 1948 brought about a series of legislations and policies that resulted in the segregation 
of the South African population on racial grounds. Given that the National Party was 
exclusively a party for people of European (white) descent, Apartheid favoured the white 
minority of the South Africa population. 
 
Apartheid systematically led to the economic marginalisation of South Africa’s black 
population, which constitutes the majority of the country’s population, by placing 
restrictions on the participation of the black majority of South Africans in the economy. 
 
When the first all-inclusive democratic elections were held in 1994, the African National 
Congress (ANC) - the organisation mainly accredited with the liberation of black South 
Africans - won the elections falling just short of a two-thirds majority.  
 
One of the priorities of the ANC-led government was to redress the injustices of the 
previous regime and to eliminate the legacy of Apartheid. With regard to the country’s 
economy, this was first witnessed by the introduction of initiatives such as the 
“Reconstruction and Development Programme” in 1994 and subsequently policies like 
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“Affirmative Action” which gave preference to previously disadvantaged individuals 
(PDI) when organisations were recruiting employees. 
 
Over time the ANC-led government adopted a broad systematic approach known as 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), later codified into statute in the form of the Broad 
Base Black Economic Empowerment Act 5 of 2003, with the intention of transforming 
the South African economy into a better representation of the population.  
 
Over the years BEE has exhibited a number of shortcomings, the main one being the 
enrichment of a handful of individuals. Commentators have argued that as government 
policy BEE should be abandoned, but government is yet to make that proclamation. Even 
if this did occur, there would still be a need to address the economic disparities created by 
Apartheid in an inclusive manner which would require PDIs to be organised and grouped 
together. In an attempt to address the issue of the enrichment of a handful of individuals, 
government has recently shifted towards placing an emphasis on community-based co-
operative structures as being the appropriate vehicles to be utilised for BEE initiatives. 
Regardless of the vehicle being used, the result is always that there are groups to deal 
with and these groups are the subject of this study.     
 
1.3     Problem Statement 
Our common laws and statutes impose a fiduciary duty upon all directors of companies to 
always act in a bona fide manner in pursuit of the best interests of that company. This is 
referred to as a director’s fiduciary duty to a company and is owed by each director to the 
company as a separate entity from its shareholders. The directors are obliged to discharge 
their duties at all times pursuing what would be in the best interests of the company. The 
question that then arises is: What informs the best interest of the company in the 
perspective of directors?  
 
Can a director, representing the interests of the BEE shareholders, discharge his 
obligations to the company independently of the interests of the BEE shareholders who 
had appointed him?  In practice, can these directors continue to pursue what is in the best 
 4 
interests of the company, even if the outcome is not in the best interests of those BEE 
shareholders?  Can this director perform his duties to the company in an unfettered 
manner despite the possibility that non-conformance to the wishes of those BEE 
shareholders might result in replacement of their representative function? All of these 
questions are aimed at establishing how autonomous directors that represent BEE 
shareholders are and the nature of their relationship with the BEE shareholder they 
represent.  
 
1.3.1  Sub-Problem 
In resolving these questions, the primary issues to consider are the following 
  
 How informed are people in business of the duties of directors in general? 
 
 Do people in business perceive directors to serve the interests of shareholders and 
indirectly the interests of the majority shareholders? 
 
 Are BEE representative directors there to serve the interests of the BEE 
shareholders they represent? 
 
 Are BEE representative directors agents of the BEE shareholders they represent? 
 
 Are BEE representative directors accountable to the company and other 
shareholders? 
 
1.4   Research Objectives  
 To define the duties and responsibilities of directors of a company according to 
our laws and policies; 
 
 To establish the expectations of investor shareholders in general, as to how 
directors who are representatives of BEE shareholders should perform their duties 
to the company;  
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 To establish the expectations of BEE shareholders as to how directors who are 
their representatives should perform their duties to the company;  
 
 To establish the nature of the relationship between BEE shareholders and the 
directors who represent them; 
 
 To formulate corporate governance practices and policies and the standards which 
are to be observed by a director (who is a representative of a BEE shareholder) in 
the performance of his duties to the company? 
 
1.5        Research Design 
The research design of this study is quantitative with a qualitative element. The aim of 
the study is to observe the respondents’ responses to questions regarding the duties of 
BEE representative directors, and to numerically analyse those observations in order to 
determine whether BEE representative directors are autonomous. The data was collected 
by means of a structured questionnaire. 
 
1.5.1    Literature Review  
This research study covered various sources of literature.  The first source consulted was 
the South Africa Common Law which is a combination of Roman and Dutch Law and 
one of the foundations upon which many South African Laws are based. Also consulted 
were: Statutory law, with an emphasis being placed on the Companies Act 71 of 2008;  
Case law which is a record of how courts interpret our laws in practice; The King Reports 
on Corporate Governance as relevant policy documents that are referred to by many 
companies in practice; Books, articles and journals on corporate governance and BEE,  
including news articles and also past research papers.    
 
1.5.2   Sample and Sampling Technique  
The sampling technique used in this research study was that of non-probability sampling. 
Accidental or availability sampling was used as questionnaires which were distributed by 
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hand delivery and email and were self administered by the researcher. The respondents 
constituting the sample size were identified in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg 
and Bizana.  
 
Due to time constraints and the limitation of resources, the sample was only made up of 
clients and business associates of Ntshebe & Associates, a law firm operating in the 
Durban Metropolitan area. The respondents were selected on the grounds that they were 
directors of companies or had been involved in a BEE transaction in the past. The size of 
the sample was determined by the number of individuals approached from Ntshebe & 
Associates’ database and who were available to complete the questionnaire.  
 
1.5.3   Data Collection  
The research instruments used to collect the research data were structured questionnaires, 
which were distributed by email and by hand. The questionnaire was designed to be both 
quantitative and qualitative. The respondents in this study completed the questionnaires 
electronically or by hand, scanned and emailed them back or hand delivered them. 
 
1.5.4 Questionnaire Design  
The questionnaire comprised two parts, the first part being demographic questions to 
allow the investigator to better understand the respondents. The second part comprised 22 
research questions, which were aimed at understanding the respondents’ perceptions of 
duties of a director within the context of research objectives. The questionnaire was 
comprised of quantitative and qualitative components. These questions dealt with 
understanding how well-informed the respondents were of the duties and responsibilities 
of directors of a company according to our laws and policies. For the purposes of this 
study, shareholders were classified into two groups, the majority shareholders and the 
minority BEE shareholders.  
 
The first four questions dealt with the duties of directors in general. Questions 5-8 were 
aimed at understanding whether the respondents could distinguish between the company 
and the shareholders. The purpose was to establish whether the respondents perceive 
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directors to be there to serve the interests of shareholders in general. Questions 8-14 were 
aimed at understanding how the respondents perceived the directors’ duties with regard to 
BEE shareholders. Questions 14-19 were aimed at understanding the respondents’ 
perceptions of the duties of BEE representative directors, and to whom those directors 
owed their services.  
 
Apart from question 19, all the research questions in the questionnaire were classified 
using the Likert Scale to evaluate the responses of the respondents. The Likert Scale 
consists of 5 evaluative statements, and respondents were asked to select one as their 
response to the questions which constituted the quantitative aspect to the study. Space 
was also provided for the respondents to comment which constituted the qualitative 
portion of the study.  
 
1.5.5   Ethical Requirements 
For this research study, gatekeeper ethical clearance was not required as the respondents 
were approached in their personal capacities and not in the capacity of the positions they 
occupied. The only clearance that was required was from the University of KwaZulu- 
Natal in order to commence the study. 
 
1.5.6   Data Analysis   
All the data collected in the questionnaires was captured on MS Excel spreadsheets, and 
was subsequently coded into the SPSS database. The data was analysed by using 
statistical software SPSS 17.0. The information was presented in frequency tables and bar 
charts for all variables in order to determine the distribution of variables. Cross-tabulation 
was also done to determine the relationship between the predictor variables and the 
responses. Moreover, logistic regression analysis was employed to control the possible 
confounding effect and assess the separate effects of the variables.  
 
1.6   Importance of the Study 
The study aimed to clarify the nature and extent of the duties and responsibilities of the 
directors of a company within the context of directors that are representatives of BEE 
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shareholders and the standards to be observed by such directors. The study was intended 
to clarify the expectations of investors, BEE shareholders and what the directors 
understand to be expected of them in the performance of their duties to the company.  
The study will make recommendations as to the standards that are to be observed by such 
directors. 
 
1.7   Organisation of the Study 
This study was organised into six chapters; Chapter Two details the literature review in 
relation to the research questions; Chapter Three details the research methodology that 
was used in the implementation of this study; Chapter Four presents the data analysis and 
presentation of the collected data; Chapter Five is a discussion on the data that was 
collected and the findings that came from that data and Chapter Six contains the 
recommendations and conclusion to this research study.  
 
1.8   Limitation of the Study 
The foreseeable limitation of this study was that the outcome will be determined by 
feedback from the directors who will be interviewed during the study, therefore making 
the study only as accurate as the degree of the honesty of the directors interviewed. In the 
event of the directors only giving responses that are merely appropriate as opposed to 
being honest, the outcome of the study will only reflect what is appropriate.  
 
Also the size of sample presents another limitation as it is not reflective of the population 
of directors in South Africa or people in South Africa that have been involved in BEE 
transactions. There are also geographical limitations as the study was conducted mainly 
in the eThekwini Metropolitan and Bizana.   
 
1.9 Conclusion  
This chapter contains a brief outline of this research study. First it deals with the 
background to Black Economic Empowerment and the objectives BEE was intended to 
achieve. Then the problem statement defines the research objectives of the study which 
inform the design of the research. The research design outlines how the research study 
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was to be carried out, the nature of the literature that had to be reviewed, the sampling 
technique and sample size, the collection of the data and the design of the questionnaire. 
The ethical clearance required was determined by the nature of the sample and the 
internal processes of the institution on behalf of which the research was being conducted. 
All of these factors determine how the study was organised and presented, and had a 
direct bearing on the success of the study and whether it achieves the objectives that have 
been established. Chapter Two dealt with the literature review and how various 
commentators have dealt with directors and their duties, Black Economic Empowerment 




























South African company law is derived from various sources. These include common law 
and statutory law, and one would have to consider these and their provisions regarding 
directors. Another area of law that had to be considered was case law. Case law reflects 
the interpretation of South African laws by the courts. Case law can be considered as the 
implementation of laws and how these laws are applied in practice. Reported cases 
provide a record of how common law and statutes are applied in practice. Even though 
case law is not always accurate, it provides a good source of reference and guidance in 
this study.    
 
The development of the King Report by the Commission on Corporate Governance (led 
by Mervin King and initiated by the Institute of Directors) signalled a new progressive 
era in South African corporate governance practices. The initial King Report was 
followed by two subsequent reports with the current applicable report being the 2009 
report commonly referred to as the King III report. The King Reports have in the past 
resulted in the development of the King Code of Good Conduct, which provides the 
guidelines to assist directors in understanding what is required of them in order to 
practice good governance. Even though these reports are not law and are implemented by 
companies on a voluntary basis, the recognition they are afforded by the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange and the number of companies that have adopted the provisions of these 
codes provide these reports with some authoritative credibility as a view to be taken into 
account when conducting a study on corporate governance.  
 
In this chapter a review of the literature available on this subject was conducted. In order 
to be able to fully address the issue of the autonomy of company directors appointed by 
Black Economic Empowerment shareholders, a holistic approach needs to be taken, and 
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consideration given to these directors within the context of a company and their 
relationship to other components of a company. Given the focus of the research on 
directors’ autonomy in relation to the pressures of shareholders, the nature of a company 
and the roles of directors and shareholders within the company had to be considered.   
How these two components relate to each other also needed to be considered, to establish 
the extent of the influence one might enjoy over another. 
 
When considering the relationship between BEE representative directors and the 
shareholders who nominated them, BEE and the disparities of the historic background 
being addressed had to be considered in detail.  The development of BEE policies, the 
projected direction for BEE and the impact on directors and their duties within the 
context of BEE also had to be considered in order to assess how autonomous these 
directors are when performing their duties. 
 
2.2 Companies 
2.2.1 Definition of a Company 
Various definitions of a company have been submitted by numerous commentators on 
different sources which serve as references when one is attempting to compile a 
definition of a company. In Cilliers & Benade (2000, P 5) a company is defined as an 
association of persons for the common object of the acquisition of gain, with companies 
not for gain being an exception. However, this definition was based on the requirement 
that there must be more than one person who is a member of a company, which 
requirement is no longer applicable as it has become common practice for companies to 
have sole members. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Companies Act) defines a company 
as a juristic person incorporated in terms of the Companies Act, or who was created or 
recognised as a company in terms of the Companies Act of 1973, Close Corporations Act 
of 1984 .   
 
According to Sec 19(i)(a) of the Companies Act at the time of the incorporation of a 
company, a company is a juristic person that has all the legal powers and capacity of an 
individual as limited by the company’s founding documents. A juristic person is 
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described as a body or association other than a natural person, which is endowed by law 
with the capacity to have rights and duties apart from its members (Pretorious 1999, P7). 
This existence of the company as a juristic person affords the company the ability to be 
able to engage in business of its own accord as a natural person. A company can acquire 
assets and those assets are the exclusive property of that company (Davies 2011 P 23). It 
can generate income and incur liabilities like any natural person. 
 
This interpretation of the company being a separate juristic person has been confirmed by 
the court, as they have continuously recognised companies as juristic persons that are 
separate from their members and are capable of owning assets apart from their members. 
In Dadoo v. Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 (P550), the court held that a 
legal company is a legal persona distinct from the members who compose it. Property 
vested in the company is not, and cannot be regarded as vested in all or any of its 
members [551]. In the case of Solomon v. Solomon 1897 AC 22 (HL) and Co Ltd the 
courts recognised that a company was a separate juristic person to its members to the 
extent that a company is capable of entering into contracts with its members in their 
personal capacity.  
 
The primary reason for the existence of business enterprise is to create value. 
Traditionally, the notion of value was viewed narrowly as financial value for 
shareholders. This has evolved into the notion of value in terms of the triple bottom line: 
social, economic and environmental performance. Today, commentators talk of the triple 
context in which companies operate, or simply ‘the context’, which embraces all three 
aspects – people, profit and planet as contained in the King Report. 
 
2.2.2 Organs of a Company 
Companies have two main internal organs, being the shareholders as a collective and 
represented at shareholders’ meetings, and the directors of a company as a collective in 
the form of the board of directors. Section 1 of the Companies Act of 2008 describes a 
shareholder as a holder of a share issued by a company and who is entered as such in the 
securities register. Each shareholder is bound by the company’s Memorandum of 
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Incorporation and by any rules of the company. According to section 15(6)(i)(a) & (b) of 
the Companies Act of 2008 the obligations and rights that stem from the Memorandum of 
Incorporation are binding between all shareholders and also between each shareholder 
and the company.  
 
One of the rights that a shareholder inherits by virtue of being a shareholder is the right to 
participate in the activities of the company during the shareholders’ meetings which are 
held in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act and the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation. Section 65 of the Companies Act of 2008 states that 
shareholders participate in the company’s activities by voting during the shareholders’ 
meetings and passing shareholder resolutions in accordance with the provisions of the 
Companies Act of 2008. 
 
The Companies Act prescribes that the business and affairs of the company are managed 
by or under the direction of the board of directors. Section 66 of the Companies Act of 
2008 prescribes the manner in which directors of a company are to be appointed, and 
these directors are not appointed to be stand-alone directors but rather as members of a 
company’s board of directors. Upon each director’s appointment that director becomes a 
member of the organ of a company which is the board of directors, and they are to 
contribute in enabling that organ perform its function within the structure of a company. 
 
The status of the shareholders as a group and the board of directors is that they are both 
important organs of a company. Without these organs performing their roles, the 
company could not function. There are certain decisions that have to be taken or endorsed 
by shareholders at shareholders’ meetings which may include the appointment of 
directors. The management of the business dealings of a company has to be undertaken 
by the board of directors. When these organs act, their actions are considered to be acts of 
the company (Cilliers 2000, P84).  When resolutions of shareholders have been passed, 
such resolutions are considered to be decisions of the company. Resolutions of the 
company’s board of directors are also considered decisions of the company. When 
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dealing with third parties, authorised actions of directors are also considered to be acts of 
the company.  
 
2.2.3  Directors 
2.2.3.1  Functions of the Board of Directors. As previously stated, the Companies Act 
stipulates that the management of the business affairs of the company is undertaken by 
the company’s board of directors. According to section 66 of the Companies Act of 2008, 
this right cannot be removed from the board of directors but can only be limited by the 
shareholders in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.  This is also echoed in the 
King III Report, where it is stated that companies should be headed by a board that 
directs, governs and is in effective control of the company. The King III Report describes 
the board as being responsible for corporate governance and having two main functions: 
to determine the strategic direction of the company and to have control over the company 
in order to manage the implementation of that strategic direction and bring about the 
sustainability of the company. 
 
The management of the affairs of the company by the board can be classified into two 
categories; the internal and external actions of the board (Cilliers 2000, P 84). The 
internal actions of the board are those that the board performs as an organ within the 
structure of a company. An example of an internal act is the management of the 
company’s finances and keeping of financial records as prescribed by law and the 
company’s constitution. External actions of a company are actions by the board when 
dealing with third parties. As a company is not a natural person and therefore cannot act 
on its own, it acts through its board of directors and any other duly authorised 
representatives.  
 
As a company is an artificial person that cannot read a written representation or hear a 
spoken representation, it reads and hears representations through the eyes and ears of its 
directors acting in the course of their duties, and “board” is the collective term used to 
designate the directors when they act together in the course of their duties to the company 
(R v Kritzner 1971).  
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2.2.3.2    Legal Standing of Directors 
The legal position of a director is best determined within the framework of the facts of 
each case (Cilliers 2000, P 118).  It has already been established that when dealing with 
the internal functions of a company, the board of directors is an autonomous organ of the 
company (Pretorious 1999, P 7). Some commentators suggest that the best way to 
describe the legal position of a director or the board of directors when they are dealing 
with third parties is the law of agency (Cilliers 2000, P 117). The fact that they occupy 
positions as directors of the company imposes certain duties upon them. 
 
2.2.3.3   Rights of Directors 
As a director is a member of the company’s board, each director has a statutory 
obligation to participate in the management of the company. In the event of a director 
failing to perform according to the standards expected of him as a director, a director 
becomes liable for neglecting his duties to the company. It is this reason directors have a 
right to the exercise their office in order to participate in the management of the 
company. 
 
In order for directors to be able to perform their duties, they have a right to expect to be 
placed in a position that will enable them to discharge their duties. This includes having 
the right to have access to company information in the possession of the company, such 
as financial statements and other company documents. Directors have the right to be 
reimbursed by the company for any costs they incur in the performance of their duties. 
They also have a right to be reimbursed for the service they perform for the company.  
 
The King Report (P 25) prescribes that in order for directors to be able to fulfill their 
legal duties, directors should have unrestricted access to all the company‘s information, 






2.2.3.4    Duties of Directors 
Duties can be imposed on a director by the company contractually and in the company’s 
memorandum of incorporation. Duties of directors are also imposed by common law and 
statutes. The focus for this research shall only be limited to the duties pertaining to 
governance as imposed by common law and the Companies Act.  Common law principles 
can be found in various sources but one of the best sources for these principles is case 
law as this reflects how our courts have interpreted these principles. These interpretations 
serve as a guide as court interpretations continuously evolve with society standards of 
equity and fairness as reflected in society’s laws. Some of the duties of directors have 
been partially codified in the form of the Companies Act. The implication of partial 
codification is that the common law principles are still applicable but those that have 
been included in the Companies Act have been varied or limited. For the purposes of this 
research, focus will be limited to those duties pertaining to the governance of the 
company. 
 
According to our common law, a director owes fiduciary duties requiring him to exercise 
his powers in a bona fide manner for the benefit of the company. Our common law 
further imposes an obligation on the director to display reasonable care and skills in 
carrying out his duties as a director. This fiduciary duty is owed by the director to the 
company to which the director has been appointed as a member of the board. In the event 
of that company being part of a group of companies, or being a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of another company, the director owes this duty exclusively to the company board to 
which that director has been appointed as a member. 
 
This fiduciary duty involves the director acting in good faith towards the company in 
pursuit of the best interests of the company. Section 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act of 
2008 states that a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the 
powers and perform the functions of director in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company. The board must always act in the best interests of the company. The challenge 
is in determining what the best interests of the company are, and what directors should 
 17 
take into consideration when attempting to determine what the best interests of the 
company are.  
 
Some commentators have interpreted the best interests of the company as the best 
interests of the body of shareholders.  When one is attempting to establish what is in the 
best interests of the company, one is attempting to establish what is in the best interests of 
the shareholders as a body, and a resolution of the board can be relied upon to establish 
what is in the best interests of the shareholders. According to this approach, when a 
director is attempting to establish what is in the best interests of the company, he/she 
should limit consideration to what is in the best interests of the shareholders.  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 states that its purpose is to promote compliance with the Bill 
of Rights as stated in the Constitution.  This constitutes a departure from the traditional 
narrow interpretation of the best interests of the company (King Report 2009, P 24).  The 
implication of this purpose is that directors should take into account the objectives of the 
constitution in their interpretation of the best interests of the company. Section 217 of the 
Constitution enables the legislature to enact any laws and policies that will bring about 
and enforce the objectives of the constitution. One of the rights enshrined in the 
constitution is the right to equality. BEE is one of the means employed by government to 
bring about equality by redressing the imbalances of the past. According to the above, the 
implication is that a director should also take into account broader societal considerations 
such as BEE when defining the best interests of the company. 
 
In Andrew West’s Theorising South Africa’s Corporate Governance (2006, P 433) two 
models are submitted to explain the approaches of directors when discharging their duties 
and indirectly defining the best interests of a company. These are the “Shareholder” and 
“Stakeholder” models. The Shareholder model is the model that focuses on the 
shareholders of the company and on the interests of the shareholders when considering 
the interests of the company. According to this model, the paramount consideration is 




In contrast, the stakeholder model is based on the view that a company is a social entity 
that has responsibility (and accountability) to a variety of stakeholders in its widest sense, 
including all those that may influence or are influenced by the company, including 
shareholders, suppliers, customers, employees, management, government and local 
communities. Shareholders are to be considered as one of a number of stakeholders, with 
their own particular interests just like any other stakeholder (West 2006, P 436).   
 
The King III report refers to the enlightened shareholder approach and the stakeholder-
inclusive approach. According to the enlightened shareholder approach, the legitimate 
interests and expectations of stakeholders are taken into account only as far as it would be 
in the best interest of shareholders to do so. According to the stakeholder-inclusive 
approach, the legitimate expectations of the stakeholders are taken into account during 
decision-making on the basis that it is in the best interests of the company to do so, and 
not merely as an instrument to serve the interests of the shareholder (King Report 2009, P 
10).  
 
With the stakeholder-inclusive approach, the shareholders do not enjoy predetermined 
precedence over other stakeholders and precedence is determined by what is perceived to 
be in the best interests of the company at that time. The best interests of the company 
should be interpreted within the parameters of the company both as a sustainable 
enterprise and as a responsible corporate citizen. This approach gives effect to the notion 
of redefining success in terms of lasting positive effects for all stakeholders, as explained 
above (King Report 2009, P 10).  
 
The King III Report promotes an approach to which it refers as the “stakeholder-inclusive 
approach”, which considers, weighs and promotes the interests of all the company‘s 
stakeholders, thus ensuring the cooperation of all stakeholders the company depends on 
for its sustainable success. The board‘s paramount responsibility is the positive 
performance of the company in creating value. In doing so, it should appropriately 
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consider the legitimate interests and expectations of all its stakeholders (King Report 
2009, P 22). 
 
 In this way, the company creates trust between itself and its internal and external 
stakeholders, without whom no company can operate sustainably (King Report 2009, P 
15).  However, the report reserves accountability for the company and only reserves 
responsibility to the stakeholders. The result is that the report appears to promote the 
good corporate governance principle of accountability with regard to shareholders only 
(West 2006, P 436-437).  
 
This approach can be viewed as a compromise between an exclusive narrow shareholder 
approach and an all-inclusive stakeholder approach. Even though the directors are not 
accountable to the stakeholders according to the “stakeholder-inclusive approach”, 
directors still have to take into consideration the interests of other stakeholders. With this 
approach, the best interests of the company are defined in a broader context than the 
traditional narrow approach which only considers the shareholders.  
 
Another common law duty of a director is that he/she is to exercise a reasonable standard 
of care and skill. Section 76 (3)(c) of the Companies Act of 2008 describes this duty as a 
duty to exercise a degree of care, skill and diligence that may be reasonably be expected 
of a person carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those carried 
out by that director and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that 
director. 
 
Section 76 (2)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008 states that a director of a company must 
not use the position of director, or any information obtained while acting in the capacity 
of a director, to gain an advantage for the director or for another person other than the 
company or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company. The director is obligated to 
exercise his power as a director for the exclusive benefit of the company, and is to avoid 
a conflict between his own interests and those of the company. A direct consequence of 
this duty is that a director cannot use his position in a company for the purposes of 
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personal enrichment by generating additional benefits which are secret profits apart from 
the authorised remuneration for his services.  
 
When a director does get additional benefits apart from the agreed upon remuneration 
that accrue to him by virtue of being a director (which can be considered secret profits), 
this amounts to a breach of the director’s fiduciary duty. The company does not have to 
suffer a loss in order for secret profits to constitute a breach of the director’s fiduciary 
duty. Even if the company did not suffer a loss, as part of the director’s fiduciary duty, a 
director is supposed to employ all of his efforts as director in good faith for the benefit of 
the company. The breach occurs when the director fails to observe this standard. Also 
when a director generates a secret profit, this has the potential of the director having a 
conflict of interests. 
 
In the case of Robinson v. Randfontein Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 the 
court held that a director should not place himself in a position whereby his personal 
interest conflicts with the duties arising from his fiduciary position as a director. A 
director is not justified in making a secret profit from his office as a director. The 
reasoning is that the information these directors receive because they are directors of the 
company, is not supposed to be used except within the scope of their activities as 
directors and for the benefit of the company. This even applies in situations whereby the 
company was not in line to take that business opportunity and a director takes advantage 
of that opportunity. Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v. Cooley 1972 (2) All ER 
162 confirmed this, and the director was made to account for the proceeds he had 
received by taking advantage of an opportunity for which the company did not qualify. 
 
The personal interests of a director, or of people closely associated with that director, 
should not take precedence over the interests of the company (King Report 2009, P 25). 
Sections 75 and 76 of the Companies Act of 2008 deal with director’s personal financial 
interests and the standard of conduct expected of directors, including conflict of interests. 
Section 1 of the Act defines “material” (when used as an adjective) to mean “significant 
in the circumstances" of a particular matter, to a degree that is of consequence in 
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determining the matter or reasonably affecting a person’s judgment or decision in the 
matter.   
 
Section 76 (4)(a)(aa) of the Companies Act of 2008 states that a director must have no 
material personal financial interest in the subject matter of the decision. Section 75 (4) 
and (5) of the Companies Act further imposes an obligation upon a director with a 
personal financial interest to disclose to the company such interest. Section 75(5)(e) 
states that a director who has a conflict of interests must not take part in the consideration 
of a matter in which he has a material financial interest, except to the extent of disclosing 
any material information relating to the matter to other directors. A director with a 
personal financial interest is not to execute any document on behalf of a company in 
relation to that matter, unless specifically requested or directed to do so by the board. 
 
Section 77 (2)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008 states that a director may be held liable 
in accordance with the principles of common law relating to breach of a fiduciary duty, 
for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of any breach 
of his duty to act in good faith and for the best interests of the company as contemplated 
under Section 76(a)(b). Failure of the director to observe a reasonable standard of care 
and skill amounts to the director neglecting his duties, and thus breaching his fiduciary 
duty, which can expose that director to a delictual claim for any damages that the 
company might suffer as a consequence of such neglect.   
 
A company cannot waive or undertake not to hold a director liable for breach of fiduciary 
duties (King Report 2009, P 120).  A director cannot contract out of this duty by 
structuring his employment contract to exclude this duty. This duty of the directors 
cannot be excluded by the company’s founding documents, and any attempt to evade this 
duty amounts to a breach of this duty (Cilliers 2000, P 140).  
 
2.3 Relationship between a Company, shareholders and Directors  
We have established three bodies that can be identified regarding companies and their 
functioning; the company itself as a juristic person, the board of directors and the 
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shareholders as a collective. Even though we have established that two of these bodies 
are organs within the company, what is important is that they are all autonomous 
structures. This autonomous nature of each structure ensures that there is a separation of 
powers between the roles played by these separate organs of a company, and this is to 
ensure the continuity and functionality of the company.   
 
When the organs of a company are acting in sync with each other and dealing with third 
parties, together they act as and represent the company. However, when dealing with the 
functions of a single organ of the company, the other organs of the company represent the 
company. When considering a single member of an organ, the rest of the members of that 
organ and the other organs represent the company. When dealing with a group of 
members of an organ of a company, if that group constitutes a majority of that organ, that 
their actions would be considered as the actions of that organ. When dealing with a 
minority group of members within an organ of a company, the majority and the other 
organs represent the company.  
 
2.3.1 Relationship between a company and shareholders  
Some commentators have traditionally considered the term company itself to refer to the 
members as a body (Cilliers 2000, P 85). However our law has developed over the years 
to establish that there is a distinction between a shareholder and the company. This 
distinction was stated clearly in the case of Solomon v. Solomon, when the court held 
that a company is a separate legal person from its shareholders, thus making it possible 
for a company to enter into a contract with its shareholders. In Solomon v. Solomon the 
court also stated that the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee 
for them.  
 
In the relationship between the company and shareholders, the other organs of the 
company, including the board, will represent the company in the dealing with the 
shareholders.  Regarding matters that refer to shareholders, the board can act on behalf of 
the company. During a shareholders’ meeting, the members of the board who are present 
at that meeting would represent the company. As it is not precluded for shareholders to 
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also be appointed as directors, there is the potential for an individual who is both a 
shareholder and a director having a conflict of interest. However this can be addressed by 
the presence of non-executive independent directors to ensure that the board remains 
objective and free from conflict of interest. 
 
A company has the right to expect shareholders to perform their role within the company.  
This is expected of shareholders as a body. A shareholders’ resolution is a formal 
decision of a company in a general meeting to act in a certain way (Cilliers 2000, P 87). 
However, the company cannot compel a single shareholder to participate if they do not 
desire to do so. 
 
In their personal capacity, shareholders are like strangers in the business dealings of a 
company with third parties (Davies 2011, P 27).  A single shareholder of a company has 
no legal standing to have any dealings with a third party on behalf of the company just 
because they are shareholders in a company. According to common law, shareholders do 
not even have locus standi to institute legal proceedings on behalf of a company, on the 
grounds that they are shareholders according to the “proper plaintiff doctrine”. A 
diversion from the proper plaintiff principle has been offered through statutory 
intervention as shareholders are empowered by provisions of various statutes to institute 
legal proceedings on behalf of a company. 
 
2.3.2 Relationship between a Company and Directors 
As stated above, directors act on behalf of the company when the company deals with 
third parties. However within the internal functioning of the company, when dealing with 
matters regarding the board of directors as a whole, other organs of the company, 
including shareholders as a body, would represent the company. The company has the 
right to expect that directors will perform their function within the internal functioning of 
the company. Shareholders have a legitimate expectation that directors will perform their 
function within the company.  
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The company has a right to expect directors to keep company affairs confidential, and to 
expect directors not to use the powers conferred upon them as directors to manage the 
company for a purpose other than the purpose for which they were conferred.  The 
company has legal recourse available should the directors fail to discharge their duties 
owed to the company, and in such a situation the company has a delictual claim for 
damages against that director.  
 
2.3.3 Relationship between Shareholders and Directors 
Directors owe their duties to the company and not the shareholders and the shareholders 
of a company as a group derive their benefit from the well-being of the company (Cilliers 
2000, P 149).   Directors can only be held accountable for their duties by shareholders as 
a group acting on behalf of the company. As it has been pointed out before, the company 
is a separate legal person which is distinct from its shareholders. Directors are not agents 
or trustees of shareholders, but act on behalf of the company and have an obligation to 
prioritise the interests of the company above those of the shareholders. 
 
As stated above, the resolutions of shareholders at shareholders’ meetings constitute an 
act of an organ of the company, which act can be construed by outsiders as an act of the 
company. The implementation of those resolutions is for the board but to the extent to 
which those resolutions are in line with the best interest of the company. A complication 
can arise when a director is also is also a shareholder of the company, and there is a 
possibility of that director’s decision-making process being influenced by his personal 
interest. This would constitute a material financial interest as envisaged by Section 75 of 
the Companies Act of 2008. According to the Companies Act of 2008 such a director 
should disclose this conflict of interest and not take part in the board’s decision-making 
process, save when expressed consent has been furnished in accordance with the 
provisions of the Companies Act. 
 
As discussed above, there is no law that prescribes what directors should take into 
account when considering what is in the best interests of the company. There are 
prescriptions that recommend various approaches ranging from the exclusive shareholder 
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approach to the stakeholder approach. Regardless of the approach chosen by the 
directors, currently the board is still accountable to the shareholders as a body. In the 
event of directors failing to implement the resolutions of the shareholders they have to 
account to the shareholders, and the shareholders can compel directors to adhere to and 
implement shareholder resolutions but only to the extent that such resolutions are in 
accordance with the best interest of the company.  
 
In the event of the directors failing to discharge their duties to the company, and the other 
members of the board failing to act on behalf of the company in enforcing the company’s 
rights against that director, such failure to act constitutes a separate failure to perform the 
duties owed to the company by the board. In the event of this failure by the board, the 
shareholders as a group have the right to enforce the company’s rights against the board 
and the individual director that had initially failed to discharge this duty. In the event of 
the shareholders as a group failing to enforce the rights of the company against the 
directors, any individual director can enforce the company’s rights against the board and 
an individual director.   
 
2.4 Relationship between a Nominee Director and the Nominating Shareholder  
2.4.1 Black Economic Empowerment  
Section 9 (1)(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa read together can be 
interpreted to imply that Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is a constitutional 
imperative, as the constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law. Section 217 
of the said Constitution states that to bring about such equity, legislative and other 
measures can be employed to promote or to advance persons, or categories of persons, 
who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
As it has been previously stated, BEE is a set of government policies aimed to bring 
about the inclusion of black people into the first economy. Empowerment is defined by 
government as an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly 
contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significance 
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in the number of black people who manage, own and control the country’s economy as 
well as a significant decrease in economic disparities (Wooley 2005). 
 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (R.D.P) includes in its objectives the 
creation of jobs, human resource development, and provision of infrastructure, changes in 
ownership and the reduction of inequality in society (Wooley 2005, P 21). The purpose of 
BEE is to promote the effective participation of black people in the economy. This would 
be achieved firstly by the increasing the portion of ownership and management of 
economic activities vested in communities, workers, collective enterprises and co-
operatives. Secondly there should be a development of rural communities and the 
empowerment of local communities by enabling access to economic activities (Paradzi 
2009, P 1).  
 
In the 1990s empowerment was characterised by ownership. This mainly revolved around 
the acquisition of shares in established companies (Wooley 2005, P 22). Due to the poor 
performance of black-owned companies, the BEE commission was formed to re-evaluate 
the path of transformation.  In 1997 the Black Economic Empowerment Commission was 
established to review the development of empowerment and to make recommendations to 
the government (Erasmus 2008, P 101). 
 
The commission report indentified problems in the approach taken to BEE by the public 
and the private sectors, and recommended the adoption of an integrated national BEE 
strategy and the enactment of the legislation dealing specifically with BEE. The 
commission moved away from a narrow definition of BEE, which focused on ownership, 
to an integrated and coherent socio-economic process which also included the 
management and control of those businesses. These recommendations formed the basis 
for the Broad Base Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE Act). 
 
The BEE strategy preceding the BBBEE Act lists as some of its objectives an increasing 
proportion of the ownership and management of economic activities vested in communal 
and broad-based enterprises, including trade unions, employees, trusts and other 
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collective enterprises. According to the new approach, as reflected in the BBBEE Act, 
BEE ownership transcends transferring assets from one group of people to another, by the 
transfer of skills and wealth creation (Paradzi 2009, P 10). 
 
The indicators of ownership transformation are control-represented by voting rights, 
economic interest and realisation of unencumbered interests represented by net value. 
The BEE code defines board members as people appointed by the respondents, normally 
shareholders (Paradzi 2009). This has resulted in the increase of broad base black 
empowerment deals over the past decade.  
 
The Wild Coast Sun empowerment deal resulted in the Mbizana Development Trust 
acquiring 30% of all issued shares in Transun (Pty) Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Sun International Limited, the Mbizana Development Trust being a community for the 
benefit of the Mbizana Community (Sun International in R25m BEE deal, 2010). Other 
examples of broad base black economic empowerment deals include the Khumba Iron 
Ore Workers empowerment deal, whereby the Khumba Resources Group issued Exxaro 
with 20% of all issued shares, the Sishen Iron Ore Company (S.I.O.C.) Community 
Development Trust with 3%, and a S.I.O.C. empowerment partner with another 3% 
(Weavind 2011). Other examples include the Sasol Inzalo Share Deal worth R 12 Billion, 
the MTN Zakhele deal worth R8.1 Billion, Vodacom's YeboYethu deal (R7.5-billion) 
and SAB's Zenzele deal (R7.2-billion) (Mashego 2011). 
 
These deals are charecterised by the BBBEE groups being constituted in a number of 
ways, and thus becoming the beneficiaries of the empowerment deal. These groups can 
be constituted by means of geographical communities, people living within the 
jurisdiction of a particular community in the area where the company to be empowered 
carries on business. An example of this grouping is the Wild Coast Sun empowerment 
deal which resulted in the Mbizana community becoming beneficiaries.  
 
This group can also be constituted by means of the employees of the company to be 
empowered being grouped together. An example is the Khumba Iron Ore Empowerment 
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deal, where the employees of the Khumba Sishen operation were the beneficiaries 
through SIOC.  A BBBEE empowerment grouping can also be constituted by means of a 
public offer, but limited to people who fit the criteria for empowerment as defined in the 
BBBEE Act. Examples of this type of deal are the Sasol Inzalo, MTN Zakhele, 
Vodacom’s YeboYethu and the SAB Zenzele deals. 
 
These deals are also characterised by the BBBEE group being grouped together utilising 
a company specifically created to acquire shares in the company to be empowered. These 
companies used by the BBBEE group in empowerment deals are usually referred to as 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). Another characteristic of the empowerment deal is that 
the SPV would enter into a sale agreement with the company to be empowered, whereby 
the SPV would acquire a number of shares in that company. Members of the BBBEE 
group are usually the subscribers to the majority if not all of the shares issued by the 
SPV. The SPV acquires the shares in the company to be empowered on their own or as 
part of a consortium with other strategic partners.  
 
Another characteristic of BBBEE empowerment deals is that the BBBEE group usually 
has a right to appoint directors to represent the BBBEE empowerment group on the board 
of directors of the company to be empowered.  An example of this can be seen in the 
Wild Coast Sun empowerment deal whereby one of the terms of the agreement was that 
the Wild Coast Development Trust was entitled to appoint two directors to the Transun 
(Pty) Ltd’s board of directors in order for the Mbizana Community to have some 
representation on the board and to participate in the management of the company to be 
empowered.  
 
A complication comes into play when one considers the role of these nominee directors 
appointed by respondents, within the context of a director’s duties to the company. The 
general belief of the constituents of the BBBEE group is that the nominee directors they 
appoint to the board of the company to be empowered are the group’s representatives. 
The belief is usually that these directors are there to safeguard the interest of the group by 
doing the group’s bidding, and are accountable to the BBBEE group. This belief was the 
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focus of the dispute in the case of PPWAWU National Provident Fund v. Chemical 
Energy Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union 2008 (2) SA 351 (W), whereby 
the court had to address the issue of nominee directors being compelled to take 
instructions from the BBBEE group.  
 
2.4.2 Black Economic Empowerment Nominated Directors 
The practice of a shareholder appointing a nominee or representative director is common 
practice in business. This is an accepted practice and can be intrepid for a numerous 
reasons. Nominee directors can be appointed by majority shareholders, major creditors 
and, in the case of Black Economic Empowerment, by minority empowerment 
shareholders. In the case of Boulting v Association of Cinematograph Television & 
Allied Technicians 1963 (2) QB 606 there is nothing wrong with this practice as long as 
the director is left free to exercise his best judgment in the interests of the company which 
he serves. 
 
The King Report states that any director who is appointed to the board as the 
representative of a party with a substantial interest in the company, such as a major 
shareholder or a substantial creditor, should recognise the potential for conflict. However, 
that director must understand that the duty to act in the best interests of the company 
remains paramount. The board‘s greatest responsibility is the positive performance of the 
company in creating value. In doing so, it should appropriately consider the legitimate 
interests and expectations of all its stakeholders. 
 
At all times a director is to consider the affairs of the company objectively and to exercise 
his discretion in the best interest of the company in an unfettered manner. A director 
cannot contract to act in a certain manner or to vote in certain way. An attempt by a 
director to enter into such a contract amounts to a breach of that director’s fiduciary 
duties to the company. Even upon the director entering into such a contract, such a 
contract would not be enforceable against that director, as it is contrary to public policy 
and is prohibited by law. In the Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v. 
Jurgensen (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 (W) case the courts recognised the right of a 
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nominee director to observe the wishes of his nominator as long as it was in accord with 
the interests of the company. 
 
In the case of Coronation Syndicate Ltd v Lillienfield and New Fortuna Co Ltd 1903 TS 
489 the court held that courts could not compel a director to perform in accordance with 
an undertaking to perform his duties as a director in a particular manner, which that the 
director  had agreed in a contract with a third party.  If the courts compelled a director to 
honour an undertaking they had made, this would amount to the courts compelling that 
director not to exercise their unfettered discretion in pursuit of what was in the best 
interest of the company.   
 
In the case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v. Jorgensen; Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v A W J Investments (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 156 
(W) the court referred to an Australian high court decision which upheld the need for a 
director to exercise unfettered discretion while discharging his duties as a director. 
However, the court drew a distinction between a director entering into a contract to 
discharge his duties in a particular manner (thus depriving that director of the ability to 
exercise unfettered discretion), and when the directors exercise their unfettered discretion 
and in a bona fide manner to arrive at the conclusion that would be in the best interests of 
the company for the directors to discharge their duties to the company in a particular 
manner.  
 
The difference between these two scenarios is that in the first scenario there is an absence 
of the directors in an unfettered manner acting bona fide to bring about what is in the best 
interests of the company, whereas in the second scenario the contract comes about as a 
consequence of the directors exercising their unfettered discretion, with the aim of 
bringing about what is in the best interests of the company. In the second scenario, the 
subsequent conduct of a director that follows the conclusion of the contract is merely the 
implementation of what is in the best interests of the company. This was also confirmed 
in the case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v. Jurgensen  when the court 
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held that directors cannot fetter their vote as directors save in so far as there may be a 
contract for the board to vote in that way in the interests of the company.  
 
In Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v. Jurgensen the court held that a 
nominee director may in fact be representing the interests of the person who nominated 
him, and he may even be the servant or agent of that person, but in carrying out his duties 
and functions as a director, he is in law obliged to serve the interests of the company to 
the exclusion of the interests of any such nominator, employer or principle. He may in 
fact be representing the interests of the person who nominated him, and he may even be 
the servant or agent of that person, but, in carrying out his duties and functions as a 
director, he is in law obliged to serve the interests of the company to the exclusion of the 
interests of any such nominator, employer or principal. 
 
Regardless of the manner in which that director is appointed to the board of the company, 
upon that person accepting that appointment, he becomes a director of the company like 
any other director, and has a duty to prioritise the best interests of the company before 
any other interest. The BBBEE group that appointed that nominee director to the board 
can be viewed in one of two ways; either as an individual shareholder of the company or 
a stakeholder. If viewed as a shareholder, that group is nothing more than any other 
individual shareholder of the company and according to law, that single shareholder, 
outside the ambit of the shareholders as a group, is a stranger to the board, a third party 
who should be dealt with like any other third party who approaches a company. The same 
applies to the nominee director who, in his capacity as a director, should treat that 
BBBEE group as a third party. The alternative is for that BBBEE group to be treated as a 
stakeholder. This can be the case when dealing with a community or with the employees 
as the BBBEE group.   
 
The interest of the BBBEE group that had appointed that director can be viewed as part 
of the collective interest of the shareholders as a body, which interest should be referred 
by the directors to the shareholders meeting. The reality is that these groups in 
empowerment deals are usually minority shareholders and their minority status translates 
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to their interest being advanced by the shareholders as a group only if its interest is not in 
conflict with the interests of the majority shareholders. Using the Wild Coast Sun 
empowerment deal, the interests of the Mbizana community would only be passed as a 
resolution of the shareholders of Transun only if that interest does not conflict with the 
interest of Sun International.  
 
In the event of the said Mbizana Community interests conflicting with the interests of 
Sun International, the end result will be the interests of the community where Transun 
operates not being met. Despite the fact that the Mbizana Community is the beneficiary 
of the Wild Coast Development Trust, the result is that Transun will be operating in an 
environment with an unhappy stakeholder which might not be co-operative. In a deal 
whereby that BBBEE group is comprised of the employees, those employees would also 
translate into unhappy stakeholders who are employees and such unhappiness could 
translate into mass action which could have an impact on the company’s profitability.  
 
Another aspect to be considered is that of some of these nominee directors might be 
members of the BBBEE group they represent. In such a situation, the result is that as a 
member of the group, such a director is indirectly a shareholder of the company. The 
welfare of the BBBEE group translates into the welfare of that nominee director 
personally.  
 
In the Australian case of Mills v. Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 (Australia HC) (163) the 
court dealt with the issue of a director being a shareholder. When a director is a 
shareholder and is promoting the interest of the company, he is also promoting his own 
interest. Lathan CJ held that it would be ignoring reality and creating impossibilities in 
the administration of companies to require that directors should not consider in any way 
the effect of a particular decision upon their own interest as a shareholder. In situations 
where directors have to make decisions which will have the consequence of benefiting 
one class of shareholders while adversely affecting another class, it is difficult to 
determine the interest of the company. It becomes complicated when a director is a 
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member of the group to be adversely affected. The court suggested that in this case the 
test should be what is fair between the classes of shareholders. 
 
In another Australian case, Harlowe’s Nominees (PTY) Ltd v. Woodside (Lake Entrance) 
Oil Company (1968) 42 Australia LJR 123; 121 CLR 483 (125), it was stated that it 
would be a serious mistake to lay down narrow lines within which the concept of a 
company’s interest must necessarily fall. Directors have some discretion to determine 
where the interests of the Company lie and how they may be served using a wide range of 
practical considerations. The court held that a decision of a director who also serves his 
interest as a shareholder is not necessarily reviewable unless it was at the expense of the 
company or the other shareholders. A decision of the directors which was made in the 
best interests of the company and was also agreeable to their wishes would not be open 
for review by courts.  
 
The above judgment attempts to consider an individual director’s decision-making 
process. It acknowledges that when a decision of a director (who is also a shareholder) is 
being considered, it is almost impossible for a director to remain objective and to 
prioritise the interest of the company when that interest of the company might be at the 
expense of his own personal interest. It would be impossible to monitor each director’s 
decision-making process and how that director had arrived at a particular decision, except 
when it was obvious that the conclusion reached would have been impossible to reach 
had the director prioritised the interest of the company.    
 
The problem arises when the BBBEE group of which that director is a member attempts 
to dictate or give instructions to that nominee director on how that director should 
discharge his duties as a director. In the case of PPWAWU National Provident Fund v. 
Chemical Energy Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union 2008 (2) SA 351 (W) 
the court had to deal with the issue of a member group trying to dictate to Trustees who 
owed a fiduciary duty to the fund of which they were board members. The court held that 
directors should act independently regardless of the views or decisions of those who 
appointed them. The court held that a director is not a servant or an agent of a shareholder 
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who votes for or otherwise procures his appointment to the board, and in carrying out his 
duties and functions as a director, he is in law obliged to serve the interest of the 
company to the exclusion of the interest of any such nominator, employer or principal. 
 
In this case, the court had to deal with the issue of Trustees of a fund who had been 
appointed by the Chemical Energy Paper Printing, Wood and Allied Workers Union 
(Union) to sit on the board of Trustees of the Fund. Most of the members of the fund are 
members of the union. The Union had passed a resolution reflecting its position on a 
particular issue of the Fund, and that resolution would be binding on the members of the 
Union. The Union expected the Trustees they had appointed to implement the union’s 
resolutions and failure to do so would result in such members of the Union being 
subjected to disciplinary hearings. The union also expected the Trustees to account to the 
union and to inform the union of the issues of the Fund. 
 
Even though in this case the court dealt with Trustees of a fund, the court considered the 
duties of these Trustees who owed a fiduciary duty to the fund they managed within the 
context that they had been appointed by a group, the Union which was a member of the 
fund. The court held that none of the trustees represented the party which appointed them 
when they took decisions regarding the fund’s affairs, nor could they place the views or 
interests of such party above the interests of the fund or its members (as a general body). 
 
The court went on to hold that the obligation of members’ trustees in terms of clause 10, 
if given effect, require them not only to ascertain the views of the Union but also to 
implement such views insofar as these lie within their power as trustees. The court went 
on further to state that the resolution required trustees who belonged to the Union to carry 
out the mandate of the Union, which amounted to the executing instructions given by the 
Union and this was irreconcilable with the trustees’ fiduciary obligation to exercise 
independent judgement.  
 
The Trustees did not represent the Union that appointed them when they took decisions 
regarding the fund. These Trustees were not to place the views or interests of such party 
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above the interests of the fund. If the Trustees gave effect to the resolutions of the Union, 
this would be acting in breach of their fiduciary duty, as these Trustees would not be able 
to exercise their unfettered judgement. The court held that it was not unlawful for the 
Union to seek to persuade the trustees to accept the Union’s views. However, the court 
held that it would be illegal for the Union to threaten disciplinary measures against 
Trustees who were members who failed to acknowledge that they were accountable to the 
Union rather than the Fund. The Union was not entitled to compel Trustees to carry out 
its instructions when contrary to public policy or unlawful to do so. This amounted to 
interfere with the rights of pension fund trustees to exercise their fiduciary duties in 
accordance with their own independent judgment. 
 
In the event of a director being compelled to carry out an order from the group he/she 
represents or face some sanction, there is a possibility of that director having a material 
financial interest as envisaged by Section 75 of the Companies Act of 2008. That director 
could stand to be removed from his/her position as director, be suspended as a member of 
the group they represent or be subjected to any sanction that might have an impact on that 
director’s financial interest. That director has a material financial interest. According to 
the Companies Act, that director should disclose the said material financial interest and 
not participate in the decision-making process in which they have a material financial 
interest save when they have been furnished with the necessary consent in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Act. Any director who fails to disclose this material 
financial interest and participates in the decision-making process could be liable of for 
damages. 
 
2.5 Overview  
A company is a juristic person that is separate from its shareholders, and can acquire 
rights and have obligations like a natural person. A company can enter into contracts and 
undertake business transactions. Given that companies are not natural persons, they act 
through different components of the company which components are constituted by 
natural people. The actions of these people within the scope of their activities as members 
of those components are considered to be actions of the company. 
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The board of directors is one of the components of a company. Various components 
perform different functions within the company, and also serve as control measures on 
each other. Properly sanctioned actions of these components are considered to be acts of 
the company. The management of a company is the function of a company’s board of 
directors. When directors are interacting with third parties within the authorised scope of 
their functions as directors, they are considered to be acting on behalf of the company and 
their actions are considered to be acts of the company.   
 
Certain duties and obligations are imposed on directors by law by virtue of them being 
members of a company’s board of directors. These duties are owed to the company as a 
separate legal person, separate from its shareholders. Shareholders benefit from the duties 
of directors indirectly by virtue of being part of the company that is owed those duties. 
Some commentators have argued that the most crucial duty of directors is the common 
law fiduciary duty they owe to the company, namely that they will act in the best interests 
of the company at all times. 
 
In the event of a conflict arising between the interests of a company (which the director 
represents) and any third party, that director should prioritise the best interests of the 
company. This principle has been confirmed by statute in the form of the Companies Act 
and by case law. Individual shareholders, as individuals outside the ambit of a 
shareholders’ meeting or as shareholders as a group, are third parties to the company. The 
director should prioritise the interests of the company before the interests of any third 
party. In the event of the director’s interest conflicting with the interest of the company, 
the director is to prioritise the interest of the company before his own interest. 
 
In the event of any individual is faced with a conflict of interest, there might be 
temptation for that individual to seek the option that ensures self preservation. According 
to the Companies Act, when a director is faced with a conflict of interest, he/she should 
declare that conflict to the board of directors or shareholders of the company, depending 
on the circumstances of that conflict. The company should decide on the future 
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participation of that director in that matter, if any, as the company has the option of 
electing to prevent that the director from participating in the conflicting matter. 
 
Regarding the issue of Black Economic Empowerment, BEE shareholders as a group 
constitute an individual shareholder. The platform upon which they can influence the 
actions of the company is in their capacity as members of the company’s shareholders as 
a group which is inclusive of all shareholders. Outside the ambit of a shareholders’ 
meeting or as a member of the shareholders of the company as an inclusive group, BEE 
shareholders are third parties to the company. Directors should deal with these 
shareholders as any other third party. In the event of the BEE shareholder being a group 
that is primarily a stakeholder to the company, such as employees or the community, the 
interests of that shareholder - apart from the platforms availed to shareholders as a group 
- such  should be regarded as a stakeholder issue. These interests should be treated by all 





This Chapter considered the literature that was covered sources from various 
commentators. The chapter described the company, the various components and the 
functions of these components within the company. The chapter also considers how these 
components relate to each other and how the effect they have on each other. BEE is also 
considered and how it relates to the nature of companies. Representative directors that 
represent BEE groups that are beneficiaries in BEE deals and the expectation that are 
imposed on these directors by the groups they represent were also considered. The 










3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the research methodology that was employed in this research 
study.  The foundation for the study was the research problem which translated into the 
research objective. The research purpose was based on the research problem and 
objective. The research purpose informed the type of research study that was undertaken, 
and the research study was designed in order to implement the type of research to be 
undertaken in order to bring about the research objective. 
 
As the research problem is aimed at studying the autonomy of BEE representative 
directors, the research population was defined so as to reflect all of the groups that might 
have an impact on BEE representative director’s autonomy which included other 
directors of companies, BEE groups they would be representing and any other company 
stakeholder that would have an expectation on any director of a company. The original 
intention was to draw an appropriate population sample that was representative of this 
population but time constraints and the limitation of resources, the study was conducted 
on a limited sample. The sampling technique, sample size and method of administering 
the study was informed and dictated to by these limitations.  
 
The selection of the research instrument was influenced by the nature of this study. The 
research problems as specified under the research questions were the basis upon which 
the research instrument was designed. The process of designing the research instrument 
included the preliminary design, conducting a pilot study and thus arriving at the final 
draft. The manner in which the research instrument was administered was largely 
dependent upon the resources that were available to investigators. Once the research data 
had been collected, a statistical analysis and reliability test were conducted to determine 
how reliable the data was. 
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3.2  Research Purpose  
Kumar (2005, P 2) describes research as the questioning of things that are done, and a 
systematic examination of the observed information to find answers, with a view to 
instituting appropriate changes for a more effective service. The purpose of this research 
was to study people’s opinions and beliefs as to how BEE representative directors should 
discharge their duties. The study is aimed at learning the expectations of various 
company stakeholders as to how these directors should discharge their duties and whether 
these expectations are in line with what applicable laws expect from these directors.  
 
3.3 Research Type 
According to Kumar (2005, P 10-12) research studies can be described as being 
descriptive, correlational, explanatory or exploratory:  
 
 Descriptive Research study 
The aim of this study is to describe systematically a situation or a problem. The 
objective of this study is to better understand the situation or problem and thus be 
able to improve the situation or to solve the problem.   
 
 Correlation Research Study 
The aim of this study is to establish whether a relationship does exist between two 
or more aspects of a situation and if such a relationship does exist, to better 
understand its nature and extent. The objective of this study is to gain a better 
understanding and to formulate how to best manage those relationships.  
 
 Explanatory Research Study 
The aim of this research is to clarify why and how there is a relationship between 
two aspects of a situation. The objective of this study would include gaining a 





 Exploratory Research Study 
This study is undertaken with the objective of exploring an area where little is 
known or to investigate the possibilities of undertaking a particular research 
study. 
 
A research study can involve aspects of one or more of these research types. This study 
was both descriptive and explorative in nature. The study aims to describe the standard 
expected as prescribed by law and also to explore whether the expectations of the BEE 
shareholders make it possible for these directors to meet this standard.    
 
3.4 Research Design  
When conducting a research, the research can undertake research in an approach that is 
structured or unstructured.  In a structured approach, the research method is implemented 
to study a situation or a problem in a predetermined manner, with the aim of making 
observations regarding the effect of variables on the situation or problem. The study is 
conducted by means of administering the same questions in the same order to the 
respondents. In this approach, questions are close-ended. This is to ensure that the 
responses can be reliably aggregated. An unstructured research study relies upon a 
modifiable research approach that affords the ability to modify the study and to tailor it 
for the respondents in relation to the situation or problem being studied. This approach is 
also charecterised by open-ended questions that afford the respondents room to submit 
their response in any manner they deem necessary. The aim of the enquiry and the use of 
the findings, are what dictate whether research will be structured or unstructured.   
 
When a structured approach is employed, the study is either qualitative or quantitative 
research. Van Maaneem (Marriam 2009, P 19) described qualitative research as an 
umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of 
certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world. The drive behind 
qualitative research studies is that there is a lack of theory or an existing theory fails to 
adequately explain the situation or the problem. Qualitative research is inductive by 
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nature meaning that the researcher gathers data to build concepts, hypothesis or theories 
and is not aimed at testing hypotheses.  This is done by collecting information which is 
combined to form a larger theme (Marriam 2009, P 15). Qualitative researches are 
subjective, meaning their observations are informed by the personal circumstances of the 
respondent and that respondent’s opinion and beliefs are taken into account. This allows 
room for the respondents to express their emotions about the research problem. 
 
Qualitative research focuses on people’s experiences, perceptions and opinions of 
situations or problems and mainly provides an explanation as to the nature of the situation 
or problem and why things happen. The aim is to understand the situations or problems in 
their uniqueness in a particular context. The understanding attained from this study is an 
end in itself as it explains what it means for the respondents in those situations or faced 
with those problems.  
 
Quantitative research aims to test or evaluate numerically data in support of or against a 
particular theory or research hypothesis, and provide numerical evidence to support or 
oppose a particular research hypothesis or theory. Quantitative researches are objective in 
nature; they are mainly charecterised by close-ended questions with the respondents 
having limited options of response, and are not given room to express opinions and 
beliefs regarding the research problem. The purpose of the study is to numerically 
analyse the data collected with the purpose of supporting a particular hypothesis. 
 
The approach used in this study was a structured one using a quantitative research study 
with a qualitative element. The aim of the study was to observe the respondents’ 
responses to the questions posed regarding the duties of BEE representative directors, and 
to numerically analyse those observations in order to determine whether BEE 
representative directors are autonomous. The observations were to be made in a uniform 
predetermined manner. The study was to test the level of understanding of the 
respondents of the prescriptions of the applicable laws regarding duties of directors by 
observing the responses of the respondents. Those observations would be computed in 
order to have an idea of the prevailing opinion regarding the research problem. That 
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prevailing opinion was to be established by means of numerically analysing the responses 
of the respondents. 
 
3.5 Population and Sample  
3.5.1 Sampling Technique 
The purpose of the study was to access the opinion of people who would generally be 
invested in the manner in which a BEE representative director discharged his duties. 
However this population would be too wide as it would encompass the general 
population and had to be narrowed and focused on the people within that group that 
would not only be invested but also have an expectation and close proximity to BEE 
representative to have some influence in how these directors discharged their duties. 
 
Research sampling techniques are broken into two groups being probability or Random 
Sampling and Non-probability sampling.  In probability or random sampling a sample is 
randomly selected when each member of the population has an equal chance of being 
selected into the sample (Bless 2006, P 100).  The disadvantage of this sampling method 
is that it could prove to be expensive and time-consuming., but the advantage is that this 
sampling method is reliable and the findings are more representative of the population. 
Probability sampling is broken down into Simple random sampling, Interval or 
systematic sampling, Stratified sampling and Cluster or multi-stage sampling.  
 
Non-probability sampling is when the probability of including each element of the 
population in a sample is unknown. Types of Non-probability sampling methods include 
availability sampling, Purposive or judgmental sampling and Quota sampling. The 
advantage of using this sampling method is that it is faster and cheaper to conduct the 
study. However the disadvantage of this sampling method is that it is difficult to estimate 
how well the sample represents the population, and this makes the possibility of 
generalisation highly questionable. Accidental or availability sampling is charecterised by 
the researcher collecting all cases on hand until the sample reaches a desired size. It is 
convenient in terms of time and money. However this sampling method makes 
generalising extremely risky (Bless 2006 P 105).  
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The sampling method used in this study has been that of a non-probability sample.  This 
was due to the limitation of resources and time constraints. Availability sampling was 
used as questionnaires were distributed by hand delivery and email and collected from 
the respondents that were available to participate.  Due to the limitations already 
mentioned sampling was to be limited geographically to the area that could be covered by 
the researcher on the available resources and within the available time period. Even 
though emails were used to conduct the study as an unrestricted email facility was within 
the available resources, the number of participants beyond the accessible geographical 
area was dictated to by the database that the researcher could access. 
 
Initially samples were to be drawn from the database of the Durban Business Chamber 
(D.B.C.) as it fell within the targeted geographical area, the database of the Institute of 
Directors as it would afford access to the directors that fall within the targeted sample 
population, the database of the beneficiaries of the Mbizana Development Trust as it 
would afford access to beneficiaries of BEE transactions and the database of Ntshebe & 
Associates for the targeting of those individuals that would also fall within the 
population. 
 
According to the Institute of Directors (I.O.D.) website I.O.D is a membership institute 
for directors and leaders in the private and public sectors. It is a platform established to 
enable its affiliates to improve their expertise, professionalism and status on an on-going 
basis. The mission statement of the Institute of Directors states that it aims to promote 
sound corporate governance to influence the conduct of business and public affairs for 
the common good. 
 
According to the D.B.C. website, D.B.C. represents a platform for its affiliates in the 
eThekwini Metropolitan area to interact and approach business as a collective. D.B.C. is 
a recognized platform upon which various stakeholders including government, consumer 
groups and employee groups can engage the business community under the eThekwini 
region. D.B.C. exposes its affiliates to all various stakeholders and makes 
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recommendations as to corporate governance practices while taking into account the 
various stakeholder interests its affiliates might be exposed to. D.B.C provided a platform 
to access an adequate number of individuals who are affiliated to it who sit on the boards 
of directors of companies operating within the Durban metropolitan area.  
 
The above mentioned organizations were approached but for various reasons, consent to 
conduct the study was only secured from Ntshebe & Associates. Due to litigation, the 
Trustees of the Mbizana Development Trust were suspended from functioning as such at 
the time the study was conducted thus meaning there was no recognisable structure to 
consent to the study. Consent could not be secured from the Durban Business Chamber 
could not be secured during the study as the researcher was advised by the Durban 
Business Chamber that the platform to conduct such studies on the members of the DBC 
was only reserved for members of the DBC and the researcher did not have the resources 
to become a member at the time of the study. The researcher did not receive any response 
to the correspondence that was sent to the Institute of Directors prior to the 
commencement of the study.  
 
From the Ntshebe & Associates database the respondents constituting the sample size 
were in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Johannesburg and Bizana. The majority of the 
respondents were from the Durban area and Bizana. The study respondents that were 
approached were selected according to the researcher’s belief of their ability to have an 
insight into the subject matter and their availability to participate.   
 
3.5.2 Description of Sample 
A representative sample was drawn from directors and shareholders of companies. 
Questionnaires were distributed to randomly selected directors operating as such in 
various areas in South Africa. The sample was made up of clients and business associates 
of Ntshebe & Associates, a law firm operating in the Durban Metropolitan area. The 
respondents were selected on the grounds that they were directors of companies or had 
been involved in a BEE transaction in the past.  
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The size of the sample was determined by the number of individuals approached from 
this database, and who were available and completed the questionnaire. Since at the time 
of the study, time constraints did not allow for institutional consent to be secured, 
Questionnaires were distributed to individuals that had been involved in BEE transactions 
as directors of companies, or on behalf of a company that they worked for, or as members 
of groups that were beneficiaries in a BEE transactions. A total of 50 potential 
respondents were approached personally by the researcher or by email but only a total 36 
were returned constituting the sample size.  
 
The majority of those questionnaires that were returned were from those individuals that 
had been approached by the researcher personally and completed in the presence of the 
researcher. There were delays with those questionnaires that were to be completed by the 
respondent and sent back to the researcher. For the questionnaires that were not returned 
there were undertakings that the questionnaire would be completed and sent back to the 
researcher which questionnaires were never returned.  
 
From those who responded, the majority were from KwaZulu-Natal. The 36 respondents 
were broken down as follows: 18 from KwaZulu-Natal, 11 from The Eastern Cape, 6 
from the Gauteng Province and 1 from the Western Cape.  From the directors who 
participated in the study, 53% were from the Durban Metropolitan area.  
 
From those who responded and were shareholders, 61% were from the town of Bizana in 
the Eastern Cape Province. The Wild Coast Sun located in Bizana, which is a holiday 
resort with a hotel and a casino and part of the Sun International group, concluded a BEE 
transaction with the Mbizana Development Trust for the benefit of the community of 
Bizana. The Mbizana Development Trust was created to hold the 30% of all issued shares 
in the Transkei Sun International Limited, which shares were allocated to the community. 
The beneficiary of this trust is the community of Bizana.  
 
A sample study of the clients of Ntshebe and Associates (who are from Bizana) was 
conducted, as they are beneficiaries of this BEE shareholder Trust. The aim was to 
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determine their expectations and perceptions as to how directors who represent them 
should discharge their duties. The other respondents who were shareholders responded as 
follows: 19% from Durban and 20% from the Gauteng Province. 
 
3.6 Research Instrument  
3.6.1 Questionnaire and Pilot Study 
The research instrument used in this study was a questionnaire. Given the limitation on 
the resources necessary to conduct the said study the questionnaire proved to most 
appropriate research instrument as it could be easily distributed. Given the time needed in 
order for a respondent to respond to the questions, the questionnaire afforded the 
respondent with the ability to answer the questions as and when it was convenient for 
them to do so.  
 
A draft questionnaire was prepared and a random sample of random business people was 
used to assess the questionnaire. Based on the responses modifications were made to the 
original draft questionnaire. Some questions were deleted or amended as they had given 
the respondents in the pilot problems. These included one ambiguous question and one 
question that some of the respondents regarded as being vague.   
 
3.6.2 Construction of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire began by describing the study and the purpose of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering letter with an attached informed 
consent form attached. The questions in the questionnaire were broken into two parts, 
part 1 and part 2. Part 1 was comprised of 12 demographic questions and Part 2 was 
comprised of 22 research questions.  
 
3.6.2.1 Covering Letter 
The covering letter from was a letter from the investigator detailing the purpose and 
nature of the study. This letter also informed the respondents that their participation was 
voluntary. The letter also served as an undertaking by the investigator to keep 
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confidential the data provided by the respondent and the terms of the said confidentiality 
undertaking. 
 
The purpose of this letter was to provide the respondents with an undertaking that has 
been reduced to writing which undertaking binds the investigator to adhere to terms of 
confidentiality undertaken. The other consent form is an informed consent letter to be 
completed and signed by the respondent consenting to the use of the data they furnished   
 
3.6.2.2   Part 1 Demographic Questions 
The first part of the questionnaire was comprised of 12 demographic questions. These 
questions included: 
 
 Age group 
 








 Occupational experience 
 
 Capacity the respondent has been in business 
 
 Number of years in business 
 
 Questions relating to a previous experience with a company involved in a BEE 
Transaction 
 
 Respondent’s classification in a BEE transaction 
 
These questions were designed for the purposes of grouping respondents in accordance 
with the above listed variables so as to be able to identify whether there are any trends. 
The questions relating to previous experience with a company involved in a BEE 
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transaction were designed to qualify the respondents and to establish some insight into 
their previous experience with BEE 
 
3.6.2.3   Part 2 Research Questions 
The research questions could be grouped into four clusters. Each cluster being one of the 
four research questions stipulated in Chapter 1 as being part of the objectives of this 
research study.  
 
Under Part 2 of the questionnaire, the questions were aimed at understanding the 
respondent’s perception of duties of a director within the context of research objectives. 
These questions dealt with understanding how informed were the respondents of the 
duties and responsibilities of directors of a company according to our laws and policies. 
For the purposes of this study, shareholders were classified into two groups, the majority 
shareholder and the minority BEE shareholder. The first four questions dealt with the 
duties of directors in general. This was to address the first research objective which was 
aimed at defining the duties of directors of a company according to South African laws 
and policies. 
 
 Questions 5-8 were aimed at understanding whether the respondents could distinguish 
between the company and the shareholders. The purpose was to establish whether the 
respondents perceive directors to be there to serve the interest of shareholders in general. 
This cluster was aimed at addressing the second research objective and to establish the 
expectations of shareholders in general as to how directors that are representatives of 
BEE shareholders should perform their duties. 
 
 Questions 8-11 were aimed at understanding how the respondents perceive the directors 
duties with regards to BEE Shareholders. This cluster was aimed assessing the 
participant’s opinion as to the expectations of BEE shareholders as to how directors who 
are their representatives should perform their duties to the company. The aim was 
basically to assess how BEE representative directors should prioritise the interests of the 
company as against the interests of the BEE shareholder they represent.  
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Questions 12-19 were aimed at understanding the respondent’s perception of the 
relationship between the BEE representative director and the BEE Shareholder they 
represent. This was to evaluate the participants’ opinion regarding the influence BEE 
shareholder might have over the directors that are appointed as their representatives. This 
cluster deals with the fourth research objective which was to assess the nature of the 
relationship between BEE shareholder and the directors that represent them. 
 
All of the questions in a cluster have the same theme but have slight variations. The 
questions were designed so as to compel the respondent to apply themselves to that 
particular dimension of the duties of directors within the context of the research study. 
The questions in a cluster were structured so as enable the investigator to compile a 
summarised statement of the respondent’s perception of the duties of directors regarding 
that cluster.  
 
A provision was made under each question to enable the respondents to elaborate on any 
issue they felt the question did not fully cover and also to state their reasoning as to how 
they responded in the manner they did to the question. The respondents were not required 
to comment on all questions but the option was provided for the respondents that desired 
to elaborate or comment. This was to assist the investigator to get an opinion on the 
reasoning behind the participant’s responses.  The comments section also served as a 
control measure to establish that the participants did apply themselves to the questions. 
 
Even though steps had been taken to ensure that the questions were not ambiguous, the 
provision made for comments below every question allowed the respondent room to 
respond to the question in a manner they were comfortable with. The questionnaire did 
not contain any ambiguous, vague or leading questions.  
 
Save for question 19, all of the research questions in the questionnaire were classified 
using the Likert Scale which was to evaluate the responses of the respondents. The Likert 
Scale consists of 5 evaluative statements which statements were prescribed for the 
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respondents to elect one as their response to the questions. These Likert Scale evaluative 
statements contained two favorable and two unfavorable statements and one neutral 
response. The use of the even number in favorable and unfavorable responses was so to 
minimize the likelihood of bias as having more response options in favor or against 
would be suggestive to the respondents.  
 
3.6.3 Administration of the Questionnaire 
About 50 questionnaires were distributed by hand delivery and email to particular 
individual targeted for participation in this study. Those that were distributed by email 
were completed by the respondents at the convenience of the respondent. The 
respondents completed the questionnaire on their own and sent them back by email. The 
questionnaires that had been distributed by hand some were left with respondents to 
complete on their own.  
 
Problems were experienced with most of the respondents not completing and returning 
the questionnaire timeously. The inclusion of the comment section below every question 
also contributed to the delay in the completion of the questionnaires as some participants 
believed they had to comment for every question and considered the exercise strenuous. 
Several reminders were sent to the respondents requesting them to complete the 
questionnaires.  For some of the respondent that the investigators could visit, the 
investigator had to visit the respondents and request them to complete the questionnaire 
in the investigator’s presence.  For expediency purposes whenever time allowed, some 
questionnaires were completed by the respondents in the presence of the investigator with 
the administration of the questionnaire being oral and resembling an interview. 
 
For this study the only ethical clearance that was required was clearance from the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal in order to commence the study. No clearance was required 
with regards to the respondents apart from the consent of each individual respondent as 
the respondents were participating in their personal capacity and the views they expressed 
were expressed in their personal capacity. 
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3.7 Statistical Analysis of the Data  
All of the data collected with the questionnaires was captured on MS excel spreadsheets. 
This data was subsequently coded into the SPSS database.  The data was analysed by 
using statistical software SPSS 17.0. The information was presented in frequency tables 
and bar charts for all variables in order to determine the distribution of variables. Cross 
tabulation was also done to determine the relationship between the predictor variables 
and the response. Moreover, logistic regression analysis was employed to control the 
possible confounding effect and assessed the separate effects of the variables.  
 
3.8 Reliability  
A reliability test was undertaken on the data collected during this research study. This 
was done by the administering Chronbach’s alpha coefficient test. The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient is a measure of the internal consistency of the data collected in the study. This 
is the most frequently used Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.  
 
3.9 Limitation of the Study   
One of the limitations of the study was that due to the constraints, the sampling method 
utilised was accidental or availability sampling. The first limitation is that the sample is 
not reflective of the population of directors and shareholders in business in South Africa 
and thus making generalizing the findings of this study impossible. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter described the decisions taken in the research methodology that was 
employed in this study.  The research problem which translated into the research 
objective formed the theme that applied in this study as a whole. The type of research that 
was employed was both descriptive and explorative in nature. The approach used to 
conduct this study was that of a structured quantitative study with qualitative 
characteristics.  
 
The sampling technique used was accidental or availability sampling which is a form of 
non-probability sampling. The sample was drawn from the database of Ntshebe & 
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Associates a law firm based in Durban. Due to the limitations of this type of sampling 
was limited and the result was that the findings of the study could not be used to 
generalize on the entire population. The sample size was comprised of 36 responses from 
directors and shareholders in various areas of South Africa. The sample size was to a 
large extent dictated by the willingness of the individuals that had been approached to 
participitants’ willingness to respond. 
 
The appropriate research instrument for this type of research was the questionnaire. A 
preliminary draft of the questionnaire was made and a pilot study was conducted. From 
the findings of the pilot study, modifications were affected to the original questionnaire 
draft. Questionnaires were distributed by hand and by email. Some of the questionnaires 
distributed by hand, the investigators had to assist the respondents to complete 
questionnaire in certain instances. The data was analysed by using statistical software 
SPSS 17.0. The Chronbach’s alpha coefficient test was used to test the reliability of the 
data collected in this study.  
 
Chapter Four dealt with the analysis of the data collected during the study. The chapter 























4.1         Introduction 
This chapter dealt with the analysis of the data that was collected during this study. The 
data has been broken down into three sections, Sections A, B and C. Section A deals with 
the presentation of Part 1 of the questionnaire, i.e. the demographic questions. Section B 
deals with the findings of the research questions contained under Part B of the 
questionnaire. Section C covers cross-tabulation analysis conducted on the data. Due to 
the number of questions for this study, cross-tabulation analysis was only conducted on a 
few core questions. These included correlation analysis, chi square tests and a reliability 
test.   
 
4.2 Section A 
In this chapter the results were analysed using statistical software SPSS 17.0. The 
information was presented in frequency tables and bar charts for all variables in order to 
determine the distribution of variables. Cross-tabulation was also done to determine the 
relationship between the predictor variables and the response. Moreover, logistic 
regression analysis will be employed to control the possible confounding effect and 
assess the separate effects of the variables. A ‘P’ value less than 0.05 will be considered 
significant. 
 
4.2.1 Background of Respondents (n=36). 
A total of 36 respondents took part in the survey. The backgrounds of all respondents are 
shown in Table 1 and in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. The age group distribution of respondents 
shows that the majority of 19 (52.8%) belong to the age group 33–43 years. Most of the 
respondents are more than 32 years, and thus they are more mature. The disparity in 
gender can be attributed to the fact that this was a once male dominated position. In the 
past very few women used to hold supervisory roles. However, nowadays the disparity in 
gender is one of the issues being addressed (Beijing conference) and thus it can be noted 
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that the female composition is improving compared to the past. Almost half of the 
respondents (61.1%) were males. 
  
The majority (30 respondents, i.e. 83.3%) were African. Almost 50% of the respondents 
attained a PG Degree/Diploma, whilst 25% a degree and 16.7% matriculation. However, 
one can deduce that the majority of respondents have a degree. The majority of the 
respondents (29, i.e. 80.6%) confirmed, when asked, that they had been involved with a 
company that concluded a B.E.E transaction.  
 
About 24 (66.7%) respondents disagreed when asked whether the company was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of another company, and approximately 90% of the 
respondents denied that they had been involved with a company that concluded a B.E.E 
transaction before that transaction.  Of the respondents, 29 (80.6%) who have been 
involved in a B.E.E transaction, describe their role as being a representative or a member 
of B.E.E beneficiary 
                                          
VARIABLE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Age-group in years 
<21 1 2.8 
22-32 7 19.4 
33-43 19 52.8 
44-54 3 8.3 
55+ 6 16.7 
Gender 
Male 22 61.1 
Female 14 38.9 
Race 
African 30 83.3 
White 6 16.7 
Highest level of education 
Matric 6 16.7 
Post matric Certificate 3 8.3 
Degree 9 25.0 
PG Degree/Diploma 18 50.0 
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Have you been involved with a company that concluded a B.E.E Transaction? 
Yes 29 80.6 
No 7 19.4 
Was the company wholly-owned subsidiary of another company? 
Yes 12 33.3 
No 24 66.7 
Were you been involved with that company that concluded a B.E.E transaction 
before that  transaction? 
Yes 4 11.1 
No 32 88.9 
In a B.E.E transaction, you would describe your role as being a 
representative/member of: 
B.E.E Beneficiary 29 80.6 
Company Issuing shares 5 13.9 
Financer 2 5.6 
 
Table 4.1: Demographic distribution   
 
Figure 1 below shows that a relatively smaller number of respondents (2.8%) were 
recorded as ‘other’ in each of the following categories: businesswoman, surveyor, 
strategist, financial advisor, retired diplomat, pensioner, architect, banker, director, 
managing director, IT technician, business consultant, auditor, researcher or HR manager.  




Figure 4.1: Distribution of occupation 
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When the respondents were asked how many years they had been in this profession, 11 
(30.6%) recorded 1–5 years, followed by 10 (27.8%) and 7 (1904%) recording 6–10 
years. One can conclude that most of the respondents have been in this profession for 




Figure 4. 2: Distribution of the number of years being at this profession. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of the capacity being in business. 
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The results in Figure 3 above show that the capacity in which the respondents had been in 
business was made up as follows:  13 (36.1%) were executive directors, followed by 10 
(27.08%) employees and 9 (25%) shareholders. This means that the respondents are well 
experienced. 
 
Of the respondents, 18 (50%) were in this relationship for 1–5 years, 8 (22.2%) for 6–10 
years and 5 (13.9%) for 11–15 years as indicated in the figure below: 
 
 




4.3 Section B 
In the view of the respondents, approximately 92% strongly agreed about the decision-
making process, and that a director should always strive to achieve what is in the best 
interests of the company.  
 
Almost 44.4% and 16.7% respectively strongly agreed and somewhat agreed that in their 
decision-making process, a director should always consider what is in the best interests of 
the company as also being in the best interest of the majority of the shareholders. There 
are instances where a director can consider that what is in the best interests of the 
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company would also be in the best interests of the majority of the shareholders.  Of the 




1.In his/her decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve what 
is in the best interests of the company. 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Strongly Disagree 1 2.8 
Somewhat Agree 2 5.6 
Strongly agree 33 91.7 
2. In his/her decision-making process, a director should always consider what is in the 
best interests of the company as being what is in the best interests of the majority of 
the shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 6 16.7 
Somewhat Disagree 7 19.4 
Undecided 1 2.8 
Somewhat Agree 6 16.7 
Strongly agree 16 44.4 
3. In his/her decision-making process, there are instances where a director can 
consider what is in the best interests of the company as being what is in the best 
interests of the majority of the shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 6 16.7 
Somewhat Disagree 4 11.1 
Somewhat Agree 9 25.0 
Strongly agree 17 47.2 
4. The best interests of the company should always be defined according to what is in 
the interests of the majority of shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 14 38.9 
Somewhat Disagree 7 19.4 
Somewhat Agree 6 16.7 
Strongly agree 9 25.0 
   
5. The best interests of the majority of the shareholders should always be defined by 
what is in the interests of the company. 
Strongly Disagree 5 13.9 
Somewhat Disagree 3 8.3 
Undecided 2 5.6 





6. In his/her decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve what 
is in the best interests of the majority of shareholders. 
 FREQUENCY PERCENT 
Strongly Disagree 6 16.7 
Somewhat Disagree 9 25.0 
Undecided 2 5.6 
Somewhat Agree 8 22.2 
Strongly agree 11 30.6 
7. In his/her decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve 
what is in the best interests of the company even if at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 3 8.3 
Somewhat Disagree 1 2.8 
Undecided 2 5.6 
Somewhat Agree 13 36.1 
Strongly agree 17 47.2 
8. In the director's decision-making process, a director is compelled to always strive 
to achieve what is in the best interests of the majority of shareholders, even if it is at 
the expense of the minority shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 12 33.3 
Somewhat Disagree 6 16.7 
Undecided 3 8.3 
Somewhat Agree 10 27.8 
Strongly agree 5 13.9 
9. In the decision-making process, a director of a company should consider, in 
addition to the interests of the majority of shareholders, the interests of the BEE 
shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 3 8.3 
Somewhat Disagree 4 11.1 
Undecided 3 8.3 
Somewhat Agree 12 33.3 
Strongly agree 14 38.9 
10. In his/her decision-making process, a director should accommodate the interests 
of majority BEE shareholders only to the extent that they are not in conflict with the 
interests of the majority of shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 10 27.8 
Somewhat Disagree 10 27.8 
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Undecided 1 2.8 
Somewhat Agree 8 22.2 
Strongly agree 7 19.4 
11.1 The interests of the majority of shareholders first then the interest of B.E.E 
shareholders. 
Strongly Disagree 15 41.7 
Somewhat Disagree 9 25.0 
Undecided 5 13.9 
Somewhat Agree 5 13.9 
Strongly agree 2 5.6 
11.2. The interests of the majority of shareholders first, then the interests of B.E.E 
shareholders are to given equal priority. 
Strongly Disagree 7 19.4 
Somewhat Disagree 6 16.7 
Undecided 5 13.9 
Somewhat Agree 6 16.7 
Strongly agree 12 33.3 
11.3  The interests of the B.E.E shareholders should get priority, followed bythe  
interests of the majority of shareholders 
Strongly Disagree 16 44.4 
Somewhat Disagree 11 30.6 
Undecided 2 5.6 
Somewhat Agree 2 5.6 
Strongly agree 5 13.9 
12. In the event of a director serving as a representative of a BEE shareholder group, 
that director should specifically limit his/her responsibility to the best interests of the 
B.E.E shareholder she/he represents. 
Strongly Disagree 15 41.7 
Somewhat Disagree 7 19.4 
Undecided 1 2.8 
Somewhat Agree 4 11.1 
Strongly agree 9 25.0 
   
13. A director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder should prioritise 
decisions in terms of what is in the best interests of the company, even if  it is in 
conflict with the best interests of the B.E.E shareholders that he/she represent. 
Strongly Disagree 8 22.2 
Somewhat Disagree 8 22.2 
Undecided 4 11.1 
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Somewhat Agree 7 19.4 
Strongly agree 9 25.0 
14. The BEE shareholder should be entitled to instruct a director who is their 
representative on how to discharge his/her duties as a director or how to vote on a 
particular issue. 
Strongly Disagree 9 25.0 
Somewhat Disagree 7 19.4 
Undecided 1 2.8 
Somewhat Agree 11 30.6 
Strongly agree 8 22.2 
15. A director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder should consider the 
interest of the company, to the extent that what is in the best interests of the 
company does not conflict that which is the best interests of the B.E.E shareholders 
he/she represents. 
Strongly Disagree 9 25.0 
Somewhat Disagree 8 22.2 
Undecided 3 8.3 
Somewhat Agree 6 16.7 
Strongly agree 10 27.8 
16. A director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder should exclusively 
account to the BEE shareholder who had appointed that director as its 
representative. 
Strongly Disagree 16 44.4 
Somewhat Disagree 5 13.9 
Somewhat Agree 6 16.7 
Strongly agree 9 25.0 
17. The B.E.E shareholder who appoints a director to represent him/her should be 
entitled to replace that representative director in the event of that director failing to 
give preference to the interests of that B.E.E shareholder. 
Strongly Disagree 9 25.0 
Somewhat Disagree 5 13.9 
Undecided 1 2.8 
Somewhat Agree 7 19.4 










18. A director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder and who fails to 
prioritise the best interests of the BEE shareholder should be replaced by a B.E.E 
shareholder unless he/she can show that the decision was in the best interest of the 
company. 
Strongly Disagree 4 11.1 
Somewhat Disagree 1 2.8 
Undecided 5 13.9 
Somewhat Agree 9 25.0 
Strongly agree 17 47.2 
19. To whom do you believe a director who is a representative of a shareholder is 
accountable? 
Company 9 25.0 




Table 4.2: Questionnaire Part 2 Findings    
 
The table above also indicates that 38.9% of respondents strongly disagree and 19.4% 
somewhat disagree about the best interests of the company, which should always be 
defined according to what is in the interests of the majority of shareholders.  
 
Of the respondents, 58% strongly agreed and 13.9% somewhat agreed that the best 
interests of the majority of shareholders should always be defined by what is in the 
interests of the company.  
 
However, 30.6% of the respondents strongly agreed, followed by 25% who somewhat 
disagreed, 16.7% who strongly disagreed and 5.6% who were undecided. Almost 47.2% 
strongly agreed and 36.1% somewhat disagree when asked about the decision-making 
process, and that a director should always strive to achieve what is in the best interests of 
the company, even if it is at the expense of minority shareholders. Regarding the notion 
that “in the director's decision-making process, a director is compelled to always strive to 
achieve what is in the best interests of the majority of shareholders even if it is at the 
expense of the minority shareholders”, 33.3% of respondents strongly disagreed, 27.8% 
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somewhat agreed and 16.7% somewhat disagreed. When respondents asked whether in 
the decision-making process, a director of a company should consider, in addition to the 
interests of the majority of shareholders, the interests of the BEE shareholders, 38.9% 
strongly agreed and 33.3% somewhat agreed. 
 
When considering the question that in decision-making processes, a director should 
accommodate the interests of majority BEE shareholders only to the extent that they are 
not in conflict with the interests of the majority of shareholders,  27.8% of the 
respondents strongly disagreed, followed by 27.8% somewhat disagreeing and 22.2% 
somewhat agreeing.  
 
When asked whether the interests of the majority of shareholders should be prioritised 
above the interests of B.E.E shareholders, about 41.7% respondents strongly disagreed 
and 25% somewhat disagreed. When respondents were  asked to comment about the 
interests of the majority of shareholders and whether the interests of B.E.E shareholders 
are to be given equal priority, 33.3% strongly agreed, followed by 19.4% who strongly 
disagreed and 16.7% who both somewhat disagreed and agreed.  
 
Approximately 45% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 31% somewhat disagreed 
when asked whether the interests of the B.E.E shareholders should get priority, with the 
interests of the majority of shareholders coming second. When the respondents were 
asked whether, in the event of a director serving as a representative of a BEE shareholder 
group, that director should specifically limit his/her responsibility to the best interests of 
the BEE shareholder, 41.7% respondents strongly disagreed and 19.4% somewhat 
disagreed, but only 25% strongly agreed. The table above also indicates that 22.2% of 
respondents strongly disagreed and 22.2% somewhat disagreed when asked whether a 
director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder  should prioritise decisions in terms 
of what is in the best interests of the company, even if that is in conflict with the best. 
 
When the respondents were asked whether the BEE shareholder should be entitled to 
instruct a director who is their representative on how to discharge their duties as a 
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director or how to vote, 30.6% respondents somewhat agreed, followed by 25% who 
strongly disagreed and 22.2% who strongly agreed. When respondents were asked 
whether a director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder should consider the 
interests of the company to the extent that what is in the best interests of the company is 
not conflicting, 25% and 22.2% strongly disagreed and  somewhat disagreed but only 
27.8% and 16.7% strongly agreed and somewhat agreed.  
 
Almost 44.4% strongly disagreed followed by 25% who strongly agreed as to whether a 
director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder should exclusively account to the 
BEE shareholder who had appointed that director as its representative. A total of 39% 
strongly agreed and 19.4% somewhat agreed that the B.E.E shareholder who appoints a 
director to represent him/her should be entitled to replace that representative director in 
the event of that director failing to give preference to his/her interests. When the 
respondents were asked whether a director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder 
and who fails to prioritise his/her best interests, should be replaced by a B.E.E 
shareholder unless he/she can show that the decision was in the best interests of the 
company majority, 47.2% strongly agreed and 25% somewhat agreed. Approximately 
61% believed that a director who is a representative of a shareholder is accountable to the 
BEE shareholder. 
 
4.4 Section C  
4.4.1 Cross-tabulation 
Statistically significant means that something is probably true; i.e. when something is 
highly significant it means the probability of that fact being true is very high. The most 
common level used to mean something is good enough to be believed is .95, which 
equates a 95% chance of being true.  
 
Correlation is a statistical technique that tests whether two variables are related and have 
any effect on each other. Correlation tests also test the nature of the effect as to whether 
one variable affects the other positively or negatively. When these variables are 
positively related, and one variable increases, the effect is that the other variable 
 65 
increases as well. When they are negatively related, and when one variable increases, the 
effect on the other is a decrease. The closer this coefficient is to -1, the more negatively 
the two variables affect each other.   
 
Correlation tests also measure the strength of the relationship. Correlation is measured by 
means of calculating the correlation coefficient  (r), which ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. The 
closer the correlation coefficient is to +1 or -1, the more closely related the two variables 
are.  
 
Cross-tabulation was done to determine the relationship between the predictor 
variables and the responses. It is highly significant with the formula (P-value = 
0.04 and Chi-Square = 4.345
a
); respondents were involved with a company that 
concluded a B.E.E transaction but the company was not a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of another company. 
 
Was the company a wholly-owned subsidiary of another company? * Have 




 Have you been involved with a 
company that concluded a B.E.E 
transaction? 
Total Yes No 
Was the company a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of another company? 
Yes 12 0 12 
No 17 7 24 
Total 29 7 36 
 




Asymp. Sig.  
(2-sided) 




 .037   
Continuity Correction
b
 2.682 .101  0.041 
N of Valid Cases 36    
Table 4.4: Chi-Square Test results 
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A Spearman’s rank correlation was obtained. A correlation coefficient of r = .119 with 
the (mean = 4.83 and SD = 0.697) was obtained. It shows that the respondents were 
positively involved with a company that concluded a B.E.E transaction and it is highly 
significant that in a decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve 
what is in the best interests of the company with the formula: ( P = 0.000 and CI = 3.381 






Std. Error  
Mean 
In his/her decision-making 
process, a director should always 
strive to achieve what is in the best 
interests of the company 
4.83 36 .697 .116 
 Have you been involved with a 
company that concluded a B.E.E 
transaction? 
1.19 36 .401 .067 
Table 4.5: Cross Tabulation table 2   
Correlations 
 N Correlation 
Pair 1 In his/her decision-
making process, a 
director should always 
strive to achieve what is 
in the best interests of the 
company.  Have you 
been involved with a 
company that concluded 
a B.E.E transaction? 
36 .119 
















making process, a 
director should 
always strive to 
achieve what is in 
the best interests of 
the company - Have 
you been involved 
with a company 
that concluded a 
B.E.E transaction? 
3.639 .762 .127 3.381 3.897 28.665 .000 
Table 4.7: Cross Tabulation Table 3 
   
A Spearman’s rank correlation was obtained. A correlation coefficient of r = -.328 with 
the (mean = 3.28 and SD =1.560) and P = 0.008and CI = 0.317 – 0.960 was obtained 
which is highly significant.  
 
  
Mean N SD 
Std. Error  
Mean 
The interests of the majority of shareholders 
first, then the interests of B.E.E 
shareholders are to given equal priority. 
3.28 36 1.560 .260 
The interests of the B.E.E shareholders 
should get priority, and then the interests of 
the majority of shareholders. 
2.14 36 1.417 .236 







 N Correlation 
The interests of the majority of 
shareholders first, then the 
interest of B.E.E shareholders are 
to given equal priority & The 
interest of the B.E.E shareholders 
should get priority and then  















The interests of the majority of 
shareholders first, then the 
interests of B.E.E shareholders 
are to given equal priority - 
The interest of the B.E.E 
shareholders should get 
priority and then  interests of 
the majority of shareholders. 
1.139 2.428 .405 .317 1.960 2.815 .008 








Items N of Items 
.688 .679 21 
Table 4.11: Reliability Statistic   
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A reliability test was undertaken on the data collected during this research study. This 
was done by administering the Chronbach’s alpha coefficient test. Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient is a measure of the internal consistency of the data collected in the study. This 
is the most frequently used Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. From the above findings, 
Cronbach’s α (Alpha = 0.688), indicates that the overall reliability of a questionnaire is 
good for the number of items examined and therefore they are all positively contributing 
to the overall reliability. 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with the analysis of the data that was collected during this study. Tests 
were conducted to evaluate significance and correlation. The tests revealed high 
significance levels. The correlation tests revealed that there was no correlation 
relationship between the variables that were tested. A reliability test was conducted 
measuring the internal consistency of the data collected, and this test revealed that the 
data was reliable.  
 
Chapter Five dealt with a detailed analysis of the data and the findings of the study. The 
meaning of the findings was discussed for each question in Part 2 of the questionnaire 
















DISCUSSION ON DATA 
5.1   Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the findings of the data collected in this 
research study. The responses provided by the respondents in this study have been 
presented as per the questions that were asked. There was a brief discussion on the 
findings of each question and the comments submitted by the respondents. For some core 
questions, the responses of the respondents have been presented in four groups, being; 
 
 All Responses; 
 
 BEE Beneficiary; 
 




The last three groupings are based on the information provided by the respondents as to 
how they would classify themselves in a BEE transaction. All Responses represents all of 
the responses provided combined. The purpose of grouping these responses in this 
manner was to enable one to get a more comprehensive idea of how different groups 
responded to the questions. This was to enable one to get a better understanding of what 
the expectations of these different groups were, with more of an emphasis on those 
respondents who are or would be BEE Beneficiaries. A comparative discussion was also 
presented, and this considered how the respondents responded to related questions for the 
purpose of formulating a more holistic picture of the opinions of the respondents. The 
comments submitted by the participants were considered to establish the reasoning 
behind the decisions of the participants and also to establish trends. 
 
5.2 Questions 1–4   
These questions were designed to evaluate what the respondents understand the law to 
prescribe as the duties of directors and what informs the duties of the directors. 
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1. In his/her decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve what 
is in the best interests of the company. 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All responses 2.8 0 97.2 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 3 0 97 
Company Issuing shares 0 0 100 
Financer 0 0 100 
    
TABLE 5.1: Part 2 Question 1 Responses Table 
 
This question was aimed at assessing the respondents’ perceptions of the duties of a 
director. From the responses submitted by respondents for this question, 97.2% agreed 
that directors should always strive to achieve what is in the best interests of the company. 
Only 2.8% disagreed with this statement. When considering just BEE Beneficiaries, 97% 
agreed with this statement and only 3% disagreed. Every respondent who would be part 
of the company issuing shares during a BEE transaction agreed with this statement as did 
all the financers. 
 
2.  In his/her decision-making process, a director should always consider what is in the 
best interests of the company as being what is in the best interests of the majority of the 
shareholders. 
 
DISSAGREE: 36.1%  UNDECIDED: 2.8%   AGREE: 61.1% 
 
This question was aimed at assessing how the respondents understood the best interests 
of the company. Of the respondents, 61% agreed that what is in the best interests of the 
company should always be considered as being in the best interests of the majority of 
shareholders. However, 36% disagreed and 2.8% were undecided. Of those who were 
undecided, one respondent commented that he was not sure of the meaning of the 
question as he found the question to be ambiguous. However, that respondent went on to 
comment “What is in the best interests of the majority shareholder is not always in the best 
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interests of the company. What is in the best interests of the company is in the best interests 
of the shareholders.” This comment means that this respondent agreed with this statement 
thus bringing the number of those agreeing with this statement to 63.9% of all respondents.  
 
Another respondent commented that: “The success of the business is in the common interest  
of the shareholders and other stakeholders.” From those respondents who disagreed with this 
statement, one commented that “Shareholder activism illustrates discontent within the 
shareholders of the company so the interest of the shareholders might not be in line with the 
interest of the company.”  
 
3. In his/her decision-making process, there are instances where a director can 
consider what is in the best interests of the company as being separate from what is in 
the best interests of the majority of shareholders. 
 
DISSAGREE: 27.8%  UNDECIDED: 0   AGREE: 72.2% 
 
This question was aimed at assessing whether the respondents could distinguish between 
the best interests of the company and the interests of the shareholders as represented by 
the majority of the shareholders. Of the respondents, 72.2% agreed with this statement 
and with the comments exhibited that “Company interests should be treated separate from 
the interests of the shareholders as majority shareholders can change and their interests 
can be different”.  
 
4. The best interests of the company should always be defined according to what is in 
the best interests of the majority of shareholders. 
 
DISSAGREE: 58.3%  UNDECIDED: 0  AGREE: 41.7% 
 
This question was aimed at assessing what the respondents consider directors should take 
into account when attempting to identify what is in the best interests of the company. 
Should the directors perceive what was in the best interests of the shareholders, 
represented by the majority of shareholders as being what is in the best interests of the 
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company? Of all respondents, 58.3% disagreed with this statement and 41.7% agreed. 
One of the reasons put forward by those who agreed with this statement was that “the 
interests of the majority of shareholders might be detrimental to the company”. One of 
the respondents who agreed with this statement submitted that “the company should serve 
the interest of the shareholders”. 
 
5.3  Questions 5–8   
Questions 5-8 were aimed at assessing the influence that shareholders have on directors 
in general and how directors in general should consider BEE shareholders. The purpose 
was to assess whether the respondents view directors as agents acting on behalf of 
shareholders in general, and more particularly, the majority shareholders. In the event of 
the respondents agreeing that directors are there to serve the shareholders, these questions 
are aimed at evaluating how the respondents believe directors in general should treat BEE 
shareholders. 
 
5. The best interests of the majority of shareholders should always be defined by what 
is in the best interests of the company. 
 
    DISSAGREE: 22.2% UNDECIDED: 5.6%  AGREE: 72.2% 
 
This question was aimed at evaluating whether the respondents view the best interests of 
the company to be in the best interests of the shareholders, and in particular the major 
shareholders. Of all respondents, 72.2% agreed that the majority of all shareholders 
should always be defined by what is in the best interests of the company. From the 22.2% 
who disagreed with this statement, one respondent commented that the best interests of 
the majority of shareholders should always be defined by what was in the best interests of 
the company, only if the best interests of the company were not in conflict with the 
interests of the majority of shareholders.  
 
Another respondent who disagreed commented that majority shareholders always change; 
therefore their interests are also bound to continuously change. Another respondent cited 
that the interests of the majority shareholders might be to strip the company’s assets and 
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to sell them, which would not be in the interests of the company. From these comments 
one can deduce that the respondents who disagreed with this statement were mainly 
concerned with the fact that there could be differences between the two interests, but not 
necessarily that what was in the best interests of the company was indeed in the best 
interests of the shareholders. 
 
The reasoning for this question was that even if the interests of the shareholder might 
differ from the interests of the company, which would mean the interests of the 
shareholders might be misguided, as whatever is in the best interests of the shareholder 
always means that is in the best interests of the shareholder. One respondent in support of 
the statement in this question commented that shareholders might not know what is in 
their best interests, the implication being that the shareholders’ interests might be 
wrongly informed and if we are to assume that what is in the best interests of the 
company is indeed in the best interest of the company, that should automatically translate 
into the best interests of the shareholders. 
 
6. In his/her decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve what 
is in the best interests of the majority of shareholders.  
 
DISSAGREE: 41.7%  UNDECIDED: 5.6%   AGREE: 52.8% 
 
This question was aimed at assessing whether the respondents viewed directors to be 
there to serve the best interests of the company. Of the respondents, 52.8% agreed          
with this statement, with one respondent citing that democratically the majority rule, thus 
implying that the will of the majority of shareholders should prevail. One respondent 
commented that he agreed with this statement “as long as they focus on the mission of the 
company”, meaning his support was conditional upon the interest of the majority 
shareholders not being against the best interests of the company. 
 
Of the respondents, 41.7% respondents disagreed with this statement. All of the 
respondents who cited reasons for disagreeing with this statement cited that directors 
should serve the best interests of the company. One of the respondents disagreed with this 
 75 
statement on the grounds that directors are obliged by their fiduciary duty to serve the 
interests of the company. Another respondent who had agreed that directors should strive 
to achieve what was in the best interests of the company, disagreed with this statement 
and commented that shareholders and company interests should be treated differently.  
The implication of this statement was that a director that is serving the company does not 
mean that director is serving the interest of the majority shareholders.    
 
Those who were undecided about this question totaled 5.6% of respondents.  One 
respondent who was undecided commented that “the interest of the shareholders and 
those of the company might be different and to serve the interests of the majority 
shareholders might be to the detriment of the company”, thus disagreeing with the 
statement in this question. 
   
7. In his/her decision-making process, a director should always strive to achieve what 
is in the best interests of the company, even if it is at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  
 
DISSAGREE: 11.1%  UNDECIDED: 5.6%   AGREE: 83.3% 
 
Of the respondents, 83.3% agreed with this statement, the prevailing sentiment being that 
the interests of the company should prevail. One respondent cited that this was to ensure 
that “the company remains on a good footing and financially sound”.  Another 
respondent stated that: “If it has been voted so it should be implemented”, meaning that 
as long as that particular decision was a decision of the company and had been taken in 
accordance with proper procedure, that decision should be implemented. Another 
respondent commented that the interest of the company cannot be compromised for the 
benefit of the minority shareholders, as the existence of the minority shareholders 
depended upon the existence of the company. However one respondent, even though he 
agreed with the statement, advised that “some compromise should be reached”. No 
comments were submitted by the 11.1% who disagreed with this statement or the 5.6% 
who were undecided. 
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8.   In the director’s decision-making process, a director is compelled to always strive to 
achieve what is in the best interests of the majority of shareholders even if it is at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. 
 
DISSAGREE: 50%  UNDECIDED: 8.3%    AGREE: 41.7% 
 
This question was aimed at assessing whether the respondents could distinguish between 
the company and the shareholders, and whether they should serve one block of 
shareholder above another. The purpose was to establish whether, in the opinion of the 
respondents, the directors should look towards the best interests of the majority of 
shareholders when trying to determine the best interests of the company.  
 
Regarding this question, 50% of the respondents disagreed that a director should strive to 
achieve what is in the best interests of the majority of shareholders, even if it is at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. The prevailing sentiment was that directors should 
serve the company. Another respondent who disagreed stated that what is in the best 
interests of the majority of shareholders might not be in the best interests of the company.  
One respondent who disagreed with this statement suggested that the motives of majority 
shareholders might be self-serving and cannot be accepted and implemented without 
being assessed first.  
 
On this issue, 8.3% were undecided. Of the 41.7% who agreed, the prevailing sentiment 
was that they considered the will of the majority of shareholders to be representative of 
the prevailing view of the shareholders as a group. The implications of this comment are 
that directors serve the interests of the shareholders. For those respondents who had 
agreed that directors are to strive to achieve the best interests of the company but also 
agreed with this statement, the meaning of this is that these respondents perceive the best 
interests of the company to be informed by the best interests of the shareholders, and that 
the majority shareholders decide on what the best interests of the company are. One 
respondent who somewhat agreed with the statement in this question cautioned that the 
interests of the majority shareholders may be ethically questionable. 
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5.4   Questions 9–11 
Questions 9-14 were aimed at understanding how the respondents perceive that BEE 
representative directors should discharge their duties as directors. These questions are 
aimed at establishing whether there is any difference between the duties of these 
directors.  
 
9.  In the decision-making process, a director of a company should consider, in 
addition to the interests of the majority of shareholders, the interests of BEE 
shareholders. 
 
DISAGREE: 19.4%  UNDECIDED: 8.3%    AGREE: 72.2% 
 
This question was aimed at assessing what the respondents believed directors should take 
into consideration in their decision-making process while executing their duties as 
directors. This was done by splitting the interests of shareholders into the interests of the 
majority shareholders and those of the minority shareholders. It transpired that 72.2% of 
the respondents agreed that directors should consider not just the interests of the majority 
shareholders, but the interests of the BEE shareholders as well.  
 
The prevailing sentiment of those who agreed with this statement was that directors 
cannot limit their consideration to the interests of the majority shareholders, but should 
consider other factors including the interests of the BEE shareholders. One respondent 
who agreed commented that directors should strive to strike a balance between the legal 
obligations imposed on them and ethical considerations. 
  
Another respondent who agreed with this statement commented that this approach would 
help to ensure that there will be maximum support for the company by the shareholders. 
Another argument submitted by a respondent was that to consider something does not 
mean one has to follow it.   
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One respondent of the 8.3%, who were undecided on this question, commented that 
democratically a director should prioritise the interests of the majority, but should not 
ignore the minority shareholders. One can assume from this comment that the 
consideration of the interests of shareholders should be on a democratic basis, with the 
interests of the majority enjoying priority, but without the interests of the minority being 
ignored. 
 
While 19.4% of the respondents disagreed with this statement, one respondent 
commented that directors should only be concerned about the interests of the company 
and consequently there is no need to consider the interests of the shareholders.  
 
10. In his/her decision-making process, a director should accommodate the interests of 
minority BEE shareholders only to the extent that they are not in conflict with the 
interests of the majority of shareholders. 
 
DISAGREE: 55.6%  UNDECIDED: 2.8%     AGREE: 41.6% 
 
Of the respondents, 55.6% disagreed with this, and one respondent commented that the 
interests of the BEE shareholders should always be taken into account, save when it is in 
conflict with the interests of the company.  Another respondent commented that directors 
should only be concerned with the interests of the company. Another respondent, who is a 
director, commented that this would be an unfair and unbalanced practice.  
 
Another respondent who disagreed with this statement commented; “Majority decisions are 
not always in the best interests of the company and in most cases they are concerned with 
the profits and dividends even if the future of the company is prejudiced. At the same 
time BEE shareholders are normally concerned with the future of the Company because 
in most cases they do not receive dividends for a considerable period depending on the 
model of financing the deal. The initial payments go to servicing the debt in the financing 
model and hence, they always look forward to the future of the Company when they will 
be able to reap from the profits as well.”  
 79 
 
Of the 41.6% of respondents who agreed with this statement, the prevailing sentiment was 
that the interest of the majority should prevail. One respondent agreed that the interests of 
BEE shareholders should be considered, but the interests of the majority should always 
prevail.   
 
 
11. When making decisions as a director of a company, directors representing BEE 
shareholders should prioritise in favour of BEE interests. 
 
Questions 11.1-11.3 were aimed at assessing whether it was the belief that a director 
representing BEE shareholders should prioritise interests within a company differently in 
light of the fact that this director was appointed as a representative director. 
 
11.1. The interests of the majority of shareholders first, then the interests of BEE 
         shareholders. 
 
DISAGREE: 66.7%  UNDECIDED: 13.9%   AGREE: 19.5% 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 66.7 13.9 19.5 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 68.9 13.8 17.2 
Company Issuing shares 80 20 0 
Financer 0 0 100 
    
TABLE 5.2: Part 2 Question 11.1 Responses Table 
 
Some of the 66.7% of respondents who disagreed with this statement believed that BEE 
representative directors should not prioritise either the interests of the majority 
shareholder, nor the interests of BEE shareholders, but rather the interests of the 
company. Another respondent commented that all directors should be concerned with the 
best interests of the company as a whole and not just a segment of the company. One 
respondent disagreed on the grounds that these directors should prioritise the best 
interests of the company and then the interests of the shareholder they represent. One 
respondent disagreed on the basis that these directors should be loyal to their principal. 
Of the BEE Beneficiary respondents, 68.9% disagreed with the statement and only 17.2% 
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agreed. None of the respondents representing Companies Issuing shares agreed with this 
statement and 80% of these respondents disagreed with the statement. The only majority 
in favour of this statement were Financers.  
 
11.2 The interests of the majority of shareholders and the interests of the BEE 
shareholders are to be given equal priority. 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 36.1 13.9 50 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 45 14 41 
Company Issuing shares 0 0 100 
Financer 50 0 50 
    
TABLE 5.3: Part 2 Question 11.2 Responses Table 
 
Overall, the respondents were divided on this question, and only 50% agreed that the 
interests of the majority shareholders and the BEE shareholders should be given equal 
priority. Even from the BEE Beneficiaries there was no clear majority on this question. 
Only respondents that represented companies issuing shares were unanimous, as all of 
these respondents agreed with this statement.  
 
11.3 The interests of the BEE shareholder should get priority and then the interests 
of the majority of shareholders. 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 75 5.6 19.5 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 68 10.3 24.1 
Company Issuing shares 100 0 0 
Financer 100 0 0 
    
TABLE 5.4: Part 2 Question 11.3 Responses Table 
 
Overall, 75% of respondents believe that the interests of BEE shareholders should not be 
prioritised before those of majority shareholders. Amongst BEE Beneficiaries who 
participated, 68% disagreed with this statement and only 24.1% of these respondents 
agreed. These findings were surprising, as one would expect that BEE Beneficiaries 
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would be more inclined to agree with this statement. Some BEE Beneficiary respondents 
commented that the interests of the company should be a priority. Some respondents 
disagreed on the grounds that the interests of the majority shareholders cannot be ignored. 
Respondents from Companies Issuing shares were unanimously opposed to this 
statement, probably for the reason that this statement excludes their interest.  
 
When one considered the responses by BEE Beneficiaries from the questions listed under 
question 11, one noticed that the majority disagreed with the statement that majority 
shareholders should be prioritised, and 68% disagreed that BEE shareholder interest 
should be prioritised. There was also no clear majority on the question of both BEE 
Shareholder interests and majority shareholder interest being afforded equal priority. This 
suggests that BEE Beneficiaries do not support any approach that suggests prioritising 
shareholders. Given that an overwhelming 97% agreed that directors should strive to 
bring about the best interests of the company, this indicates that BEE Beneficiaries are 
more in favour of BEE representative directors prioritising the interests of the company 
in their decision making process. 
5.5 Questions 12–19   
These questions were aimed at understanding the respondent’s perception of the 
relationship between the BEE representative director and the BEE Shareholder they 
represent. These questions were aimed at establishing the authority that the BEE 
Shareholder has over these directors to establish how autonomous are these directors. 
 
12. In the event of a director serving as a representative of a BEE Shareholder group, 
that director should specifically limit his/her responsibility to the best interests of the 
B.E.E Shareholder s/he represents. 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 61.1 2.8 36.1 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 62 20 34 
Company Issuing shares 60 0 20 
Financer 50 0 50 
TABLE 5.5: Part 2 Question 12 Responses Table 
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The responses on this question supported the observations made above regarding BEE 
Beneficiaries supporting the notion of the best interest of the company being prioritised 
as 62% disagreed that BEE representative directors should not just limit their 
responsibility to the best interest of the BEE Shareholder they represent. None of the 
respondent groups as listed above agreed with this statement. 
 
13. A director who is a representative of a BEE Shareholder should prioritise decisions 
in terms of what is in the best interest of the company, even if that, is in conflict with 
the best interest of the BEE Shareholders that he/she represents. 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 44.4 11.2 44.4 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 51 13.8 34.5 
Company Issuing shares 20 0 80 
Financer 0 0 100 
    
TABLE 5.6: Part 2 Question 13 Responses Table 
 
This statement was only supported by respondents that represented Companies Issuing 
Shares and Financers as they agree with this statement by 80% and 100% respectively. 
When all of the responses were considered, there was an equal amount of respondents 
that agreed with this statement and those that disagreed. Since these were both 44.4% and 
11.2% being undecided, one cannot make a reach any overall conclusion on this question. 
When considering just the BEE Beneficiary respondents, they disagreed with this 
statement by a slight majority of 1%. As they had agreed by an overwhelming majority 
that directors should strive to achieve the best interest of the company it appeared a slight 
majority believed that B.E.E shareholders should strive to achieve the best interest of the 
company save for when the interest of the company conflicts with the best interest of the 





14. The BEE Shareholder should be entitled to instruct a director who is their 
representative on how to discharge their duties as a director or how to vote on a 
particular issue 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 44.4 2.8 52.8 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 45 3 52 
Company Issuing shares 20 0 80 
Financer 100 0 0 
TABLE 5.7: Part 2 Question 14 Responses Table 
 
Overall the respondents agreed that a BEE shareholder should be entitled to instruct a 
director that is their representative on how to discharge their duties and how to vote on a 
particular issue.45% of BEE Beneficiaries disagreed with this statement whereas 3% was 
undecided thus meaning this statement was supported by a slight majority of 2%.The 
prevailing sentiment from those BEE Beneficiaries that disagreed with this statement was 
that a directors have to be given enough room to exercise their free discretion when 
making decisions.  
 
Even 80% of all Companies Issuing shares agreed with this statement with one 
respondent commenting that “provided that the company had provided for this. Financers 
were unanimous in their opposition to this statement. Those that supported this statement 
commented that such a director was appointed by the BEE shareholder and thus 
represents and accounts to the BEE shareholder. The implication was that this director is 
an agent of the BEE shareholder. One respondent that was undecided on this statement 
commented that they agreed with these directors being told how to vote but not the other 







15. A director who is a representative of a BEE Shareholder should only consider the 
best interest of the company to the extent that what is in the best interest of the 
company is not in conflict with the best interest of the BEE Shareholders that he/she 
represents. 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 47.2 8.3 44.5 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 48.3 10.3 41.4 
Company Issuing shares 40 0 60 
Financer 50 0 50 
TABLE 5.8: Part 2 Question 15 Responses Table 
 
This question was aimed at evaluating the stand point of the respondents in the event of 
the respondents being inclined towards BEE Representative Directors prioritizing the best 
interest of the BEE shareholder they represent. Should these directors consider the 
interest of the company only when that company interest is not against the interest of the 
BEE shareholder? This statement in this question is to some extent the opposite of the 
statement under question 13 so also serves to verify the stand point of the respondents on 
how BEE representative directors should consider the best interest of the company. 
 
Like in question 13, for this question overall the respondents failed to register a majority. 
The respondents were divided with 47.2% disagreeing and 44.5% agreeing.  The B.E.E 
Beneficiaries also failed to register a majority as 48.3% and 41.4% agreed as opposed to 
the 51% disagreeing with this statement. One respondent that agreed with this statement 
cited that there would not be a conflict if the interest of the company catered for the 
interest of the BEE shareholder. Another respondent also in support also commented that 
the interest of the company should be collective and include everyone.  
 
The statement only received majority support with the respondents that represented 
Companies Issuing shares who agree with 60% agreeing and 40% of the respondents 
disagreeing. Financers were also divided on this question.  Question 13 and 15 read 
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together suggest that the respondents do not support any that suggests that BEE 
representative directors should prioritise the interest of the BEE shareholder or that of the 
company suggesting that a balance should be reached. One respondent that was 
undecided commented that “this is a catch 22 situation” with the law prescribing that the 
director should prioritise the interest of the company but the BEE shareholder reserves 
the right to replace the director.  
 
16. A director who is a representative of a BEE Shareholder should exclusively 
account to the BEE shareholder that had appointed that director as its representative 
 
DISSAGREE: 58.3%   UNDECIDED   AGREE: 41.7% 
 
58.3% of the respondents disagreed with this statement whereas 41.7% agreed. From 
those respondents that disagreed with the statement one suggested that to limit these 
directors in this way was too restrictive for a director. From those that supported the 
statement, the prevailing sentiment was that these directors are accountable to the BEE 
shareholder that appointed them. One respondent that somewhat agree cited that these 
directors should also be accountable to the company.  
 
17. The BEE Shareholder who appoints a director to represent it should be entitled to 
replace that representative director in the event of that director failing to give 
preference to the interests of that BEE shareholder. 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 38.9 2.8 58.3 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 30 0 63 
Company Issuing shares 40 20 40 
Financer 0 0 100 
TABLE 5.9: Part 2 Question 17 Responses Table 
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58.3% of all respondents agreed that the BEE shareholders should be entitled to replace a 
representative director should that director not giving preference to the interest of the 
BEE shareholder. 63% of BEE Beneficiaries agreed with this statement. The respondents 
representing the Company Issuing Shares were divided on this issue as there was a 40% 
in favour and against the statement with 20% being undecided.  
  
18.  A director who is a representative of a BEE Shareholder and who fails to prioritise 
the best interest of the BEE Shareholder, should be replaced by the BEE Shareholder 
unless s/he can show that the decision was in the best interest of the company? 
 
 DISAGREE % UNDECIDED % AGREE % 
All Responses 13.9 13.9 72.2 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 17.2 14 69 
Company Issuing shares 0 0 100 
Financer 50 0 50 
TABLE 5.10: Part 2 Question 18 Responses Table 
 
72.2% of all respondents agreed with this statement and 69% of BEE Beneficiaries also 
agreed. The responses of the respondents to this question show that the respondents do 
support that the best interest of the company should be considered by these directors and 
have not been able to reach an agreement on how BEE directors should prioritise between 
the interests of the company and the interests of the BEE shareholders. However they 
seemed to appreciate that the BEE has the right to replace these directors should they not 
prioritise the interests of the BEE shareholders with the only exception being when they 
fail to prioritise the interests of the BEE shareholders on the grounds that it was in the 
best interest of the company. This shows that the respondents accepted that the BEE 
shareholder should be entitled to replace these directors but they do not exactly support 













All Responses 25 61.1 13.9 
B.E.E  Beneficiary 14 69 17 
Company Issuing shares 60 40 0 
Financer 100 0 0 
TABLE 5.11: Part 2 Question 19 Responses Table 
 
Overall the respondents believed that the BEE shareholder is accountable to the BEE 
shareholder they represent. 69% of BEE Beneficiaries also agreed. Even though 60% of 
the representatives of the representatives of Companies Issuing shares believe that these 
directors are accountable to the company whereas 40% of these representatives believed 
that these directors are accountable to the BEE shareholder they represent.  
 
 5.6   CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter reflected a discussion on the responses that were given by the respondents. 
The findings were presented in groups based on how the respondent would be classified 
in a BEE transaction. The findings revealed that the respondents were consistent on the 
supremacy of the best interest of the company. The respondents believed the best interest 
of the company prevailed above the interests of all shareholders. The majority of the 
respondents supported that BEE shareholder should enjoy authority over BEE 
representatives directors including the right to dictate to that director how that director 
should discharge their duties and vote on issues and also the authority to replace these 
directors. However the respondents believed that the authority of the B.E.E shareholder 
over the BEE representative directors should not be at the expense of the interest of the 
company. Chapter Six deals with the investigator’s conclusions from the findings of the 
data analysed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1   Introduction 
The problem statement of this study was primarily to identify the duties of directors 
within the context of BEE and determine the sentiments of the stakeholders to a BEE 
transaction. These findings would be used to identify if there were any disparities 
between what is prescribed by law and the expectations of the relevant stakeholders in a 
BEE transaction.  The enquiry was whether a director appointed by a BEE shareholder 
discharges his obligations to the company independently from the interests of the BEE 
shareholder who had appointed him?  
 
This problem statement was addressed by means of formulating research objectives 
which reflected the desired outcomes of this study. These research objectives were the 
foundations upon which this study was based and went on to inform every aspect of this 
study.   
 
Each research objective has been addressed separately even though they might overlap on 
some aspects. The findings of each research objective were addressed by considering the 
findings of the literature review and then the findings of the data analysed. The findings 
of the literature review outlined the standard of conduct to be observed by directors in the 
performance of their duties. The findings of the data analysed reflected the understanding 
of the respondents of these duties of directors. From the findings of this study, 
recommendations were formulated which can assist with future studies. 
 
6.2  Research Objective One 
6.2.1 Research Objective and Question 
The first objective of this research study was to define the duties and responsibilities of 
directors of a company according to South African laws and policies. The purpose of this 
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objective was to set a standard which would be used to measure people’s understanding 
of these duties.  
 
6.2.2 Conclusion on literature review 
A company was described as a juristic person, which in turn was described as a body or 
association other than a natural person having a capacity to have rights and duties apart 
from its members. Since companies are not natural persons and cannot talk, listen or act 
in their own behalf, companies have natural persons performing certain acts on their 
behalf. 
 
Companies have people who perform various functions on their behalf, and these people 
form part of the different components of a company. One of those components is the 
company’s board of directors. In addition to performing functions within the company, 
the board of directors performs external functions in representing the company when the 
company interacts with third parties. 
 
The management of the company is the function of the board of directors. South African 
Common Law imposes a fiduciary duty upon all company directors. The fiduciary duty 
comprises the duty to act in the best interests of the company at all times and to exercise 
reasonable care and skill in the performance of duties. The duty to act in the best interests 
of the company involves directors prioritising the best interests of the company at all 
times. These duties are owed to the company as a separate juristic person, separate from 
its shareholders. 
 
This fiduciary duty has been partially codified in various provisions of the Companies 
Act of 2008. An example of this is Section 76(3) (b) of this Act which states that 
directors must act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. Section 75 deals 
with director conflict of interests in the form of personal financial interests. Section 76 
deals with the standard of director’s conduct.  
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In light of the above, directors are legally obliged to comply with the law and act in the 
best interest of the company at all times without pandering any other interest. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion on findings of Objective One 
The study revealed that a total of 97% of the respondents agreed that directors should 
always strive to achieve what is in the best interests of the company. Only 3% of the 
respondents disagreed with this statement, but no explanation was submitted why they 
disagreed with this statement. Overall, the sentiment of the respondents regarding this 
statement was in line with the prescribed duties of directors that they should act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the company. The majority of the respondents in this 
study agreed that there was a difference between the best interests of the company and 
the best interests of the majority shareholders. A total of 58.3% of the respondents to this 
research study disagreed with the notion that the best interests of the company should 
always be defined according to the best interests of the majority of shareholders.  The fact 
that almost 42% of the respondents agreed showed a significant disparity and 
recommendations for addressing this have been included in the recommendations below.  
 
6.3  Research Objective Two 
6.3.1 Research Objective and Question 
The second objective was to establish the expectations of investor shareholders in general 
as to how directors who are representatives of BEE shareholders should perform their 
duties to the company. The first question to consider was whether people in business 
perceived directors to serve the interests of shareholders and indirectly the interests of the 
majority shareholders. The second enquiry was whether the same applied to directors 
who are representatives of BEE shareholders. 
 
6.3.2 Conclusion on literature review 
In Daddoo v. Krugersdorp Municipal Council, the court held that a legal company is a 
legal persona distinct from its shareholders. In the case of Solomon v. Solomon and Co 
Ltd the courts recognised that a company was a separate juristic person to its members to 
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the extent that a company is capable of entering into contracts with its members in their 
personal capacity.  
 
Various approaches have been submitted as to what directors should take into account 
when discharging their duties to the company. These include the shareholder approach, 
the stakeholder approach, the enlightened shareholder approach and the stakeholder-
inclusive approach.  
 
Merely controlling a majority shareholding in a company does not entitle a shareholder to 
unilaterally decide company policy. The requirements as prescribed by the Act must be 
met first, and such variation must be done following proper procedures. In the absence of 
resolutions being passed to this effect and internal company procedures being followed, 
directors are not compelled to consider the best interests of the majority of shareholders 
as being the best interests of the company. Even when a shareholder does meet the 
required quota to vary the company’s policy, directors are still compelled to consider 
what is in the best interests of the company and should not just limit their view to the 
wishes of the shareholders as reflected by resolutions passed by the majority of 
shareholders. 
 
An alternative approach is the stakeholder approach. In this approach, the directors treat 
the shareholders as one of the stakeholders who need to be considered in decision 
making. The King III Report promotes an approach which it refers to as the “stakeholder 
inclusive approach” which considers, weighs and promotes the interests of all the 
company‘s stakeholders, thus ensuring the cooperation of all stakeholders the company 
depends on for its sustainable success. The King Report recommends that the board‘s 
paramount responsibility is the positive performance of the company in creating value. In 
doing so, it should appropriately consider the legitimate interests and expectations of all 
its stakeholders. 
 
From the above, it is clear that directors should consider the interests of shareholders 
when they discharge their duties to the company. As to what other factors directors 
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should take into account when making decisions, there is no prescribed formula. Given 
that the JSE recognises the King Report and its recommendations for listed companies, 
the stakeholder inclusive approach might be the best option, especially for directors of 
listed companies as this approach instills confidence that the company is managed in a 
responsible manner that is not just driven by profits but is also sensitive to the impact it 
has in society. 
  
In PPWAWU National Provident Fund v. Chemical Energy Paper Printing, Wood and 
Allied Workers Union 2008 (2) SA 351 (W) the court held that a director is not a servant 
or an agent of a shareholder who votes for or otherwise procures his appointment to the 
board. In the Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v. Jurgensen case the courts 
recognised the right of a nominee director to observe the wishes of his nominator as long 
as they agreed with the interests of the company.  
 
In the Australian case Harlowe’s Nominees (PTY) Ltd v. Woodside (Lake Entrance) Oil 
Company it was held that would be a serious mistake to lay down narrow lines within 
which the concept of a company’s interests must necessarily fall. Directors have some 
discretion to determine where the interests of the Company lie and how they may be 
served may involve a wide range of practical considerations. 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion on findings of the Objective Two 
The majority of respondents in this study felt that the interests of the majority of 
shareholders did not inform the interests of the company. The respondents agreed by a 
slight majority of 2.8% that directors should strive to achieve the best interests of the 
majority of shareholders. This might signal a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
respondents of how companies function, and suggests that the majority shareholders 
might by virtue of being majority shareholders dictate to the directors how the directors 
should discharge their duties. Another possibility might be that even though the 
respondents understand the difference between the interests of the company and the 
interests of the majority shareholders, some respondents might consider that the directors 
cannot divorce themselves from the will of the majority shareholders and must implement 
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the will of the majority, who could have a direct bearing on whether those directors 
should retain their positions as a directors or not. 
 
A total of 83% of respondents agreed that the directors should aim to achieve the best 
interests of the company even at the expense of the minority shareholders. However, the 
respondents failed to agree by any majority as to whether directors should strive to 
achieve the best interests of the majority shareholders even if at the expense of the 
minority shareholders, with the highest percentage registered being 50% disagreeing with 
this view.  
 
What this showed was that the respondents were not opposed to directors striving to 
achieve the best interests of the majority of shareholders, but no conclusive support could 
be gained that this should be done at the expense of the minority shareholders. Even 
though it might be fine to strive to realise the best interests of the company at the expense 
of the minority shareholders, the minority shareholders should not be subjected to the 
interests of the majority shareholders. 
 
6.4   Research Objective Three 
6.4.1 Research Objective and Question 
This objective aimed to establish the expectations of BEE shareholders as to how 
directors who are their representatives should perform their duties to the company. The 
questions focusing on this objective were aimed at establishing whether the respondents 
considered BEE representative directors there to serve the interests of the BEE 
shareholders that they represent?  
 
6.4.2 Conclusion on Literature Review 
Section 7 of the Companies Act states that the purpose of this Act is to promote 
compliance with the Bill of Rights provided for in the Constitution. Section 217 of the 
Constitution enables the legislature to enact any laws and policies that will bring about 
and enforce the objectives of the constitution. One of the rights enshrined in the 
constitution is the right to equality. BEE is one of the means employed by government to 
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bring about equality by redressing the imbalances of the past. According to the above, the 
implication is that a director should also take into account broader societal considerations 
such as BEE when defining what would be in the best interests of the company. 
 
BEE can be considered to be a constitutional imperative as the constitution provides that 
everyone is equal before the law. To bring about such equity legislature, other measures 
can be employed to promote or to advance persons or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The fact that a BEE representative director might 
be a member of the BEE group they represent does not render that director’s 
consideration of the interests of the BEE shareholders they represent inappropriate. The 
courts have previously held that a decision of a director which also serves his interests as 
a shareholder is not necessarily reviewable unless it was at the expense of the company or 
the other shareholders. A decision of the directors made in the best interests of the 
company and also agreeable to their wishes would not be open for review by courts. If a 
company has a bad BEE transformation record and BEE is a priority for that company, 
the skilling of the members of the BEE shareholder group and affirmative action 
appointment might be what is in the best interest of the company and should be 
prioritised. The reasoning behind this is that whatever is in the best interest of the 
company will translate into the best interest of the shareholders.  
 
6.4.3 Conclusion of findings of Objective Three 
A total of 66% of the respondents believed that the interests of the majority shareholders 
should be prioritised before the interests of the BEE shareholders, and 75% disagreed 
with the proposition that the interests of the BEE shareholders should be prioritised 
before the interests of the majority shareholder. No majority view could be reached by 
the respondents on whether a balance should be reached, and both the interests of BEE 
shareholders and majority shareholders given equal priority.  When one considered the 
findings of Objective One above it was clear that the respondents supported that directors 
should strive to achieve what was in the best interest of the company and to prioritise that 
interest above all other interests. From the findings of Objective Three it is clear that the 
issue of how the different interests of the groupings within the company should be 
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prioritized when attempting to determine what is in the best interest of the company is a 
cause of conflict as the respondents differed. The lack of uniformity in this regard 
indicates lack of understanding from the participants as to the obligations imposed on 
directors. Recommendations of how to address this issue have been included below. 
 
6.5  Research Objective Four 
6.5.1 Research Objective and Question 
This objective was aimed at establishing the nature of the relationship between BEE 
shareholders and the directors who represent them. The question arising from this 
objective is whether BEE representative directors are merely representatives of the BEE 
shareholders they represent, and only there to advance the interests of the BEE 
shareholders they represent. 
 
6.5.2 Conclusion on Literature Review 
When a BEE representative director interacts with the BEE shareholders who nominated 
him/her, one has to consider the relationship between that representative director and the 
shareholders. The BEE shareholder who appointed that nominee director to the board can 
be viewed in one of two ways; either as an individual shareholder of the company or a 
stakeholder. If viewed as a shareholder, that group is nothing more than any other 
individual shareholder of the company, and according to law that single shareholder, 
outside the ambit of the shareholders as a group, is a stranger to the board, a third party 
who should be dealt with as any other third party approaching the company. The same 
applies to the nominee director and that director in his capacity as a director should treat 
the BEE shareholder as a third party, or alternatively should treat that shareholder as a 
stakeholder. 
 
The King Report states that any director, who is appointed to the board as the 
representative of a party with substantial interests in the company, has a duty to act in the 
best interests of the company. The board‘s paramount responsibility is the positive 
performance of the company in creating value. In doing so, it should appropriately 
consider the legitimate interests and expectations of all its stakeholders. 
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At all times a director is to consider the affairs of the company in an objective manner 
and to exercise his discretion in an unfettered manner. A director cannot contract to act in 
a certain manner or to vote in certain way. An attempt by a director to enter into such a 
contract amounts to a breach of that director’s fiduciary duties to the company. Even 
upon the director entering into such a contract, such a contract would not be enforceable 
against that director as it is contrary to public policy. This is prohibited by law as that 
would amount to interfering with that director’s ability to exercise his unfettered 
discretion in the performance of his/her duties as a director. 
 
Courts have recognised the right of a nominee director to observe the wishes of his 
nominator as long as it accords with the interests of the company. That director is in law 
obliged to serve the interests of the company to the exclusion of the interests of any such 
nominator, employer or principle.   
 
In PPWAWU National Provident Fund v. Chemical Energy Paper Printing, Wood and 
Allied Workers Union 2008 (2) SA 351 (W) the court held that a director who is a 
nominee director is in law obliged to serve the interests of the company to the exclusion 
of the interests of any such nominator, employer or principal. It would be unlawful to 
threaten directors with a sanction should they fail to implement the wishes of the member 
who appointed them, as this would amount to interfering with the right of directors to 
exercise unfettered discretion and discharge their fiduciary duty to the company 
 
In the event of a director being compelled to carry out an order of the group they 
represent or face some sanction, there is a possibility of that director having a material 
financial interest as envisaged by Section 75 of the Companies Act.  The possibility that 
the said director could stand to be removed from his/her position as a representative 
director, or be suspended as a member of the group they represent or be subjected to any 
sanction  might have an impact on that director’s financial interests. That director would 
have a material financial interests on the matter, and, according to the Companies Act, 
he/she should disclose the said material financial interests to the company and not 
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participate in the decision making-process  of the matter they have material financial 
interests, save for when they have been furnished with the necessary consent of the 
company in accordance with the recommendations of the Act. Any director who fails to 
disclose these material financial interests and participates in the decision-making process 
could be personally liable of for any damages that might be suffered by the company. 
 
6.5.3 Conclusion on findings of Objective Four 
A total of 61.1% of respondents disagreed with the suggestion that BEE representative 
directors should limit their responsibility to the interests of the BEE shareholders.  The 
respondents could not register any majority on whether the BEE representative director 
should prioritise the interests of the company before the interests of the BEE shareholders 
they represent. A total of 52.8% of respondents agreed that BEE shareholders should be 
entitled to instruct a director who is their representative on how to discharge their duties 
as a director or how to vote on a particular issue. The respondents failed to register a 
majority when asked whether directors should prioritise the best interests of the company 
only to the extent that it was not in conflict with the best interests of the BEE 
shareholders they represent.  
 
A total of 58% agreed that a BEE shareholder should be entitled to replace a director who 
represents that shareholder, but agreed by a bigger majority of 72.2% that such a director 
should not be replaced by the BEE shareholder they represent if they can show that their 
failure to prioritise that shareholder’s interests was in the best interests of the company. 
Again the respondents were consistent on the notion that the best interests of the 
company should be prioritised. However the fact that the respondents believed that the 
BEE shareholder is entitled to instruct their representative director on how to discharge 







6.6   Research Objective Five 
6.6.1 Research Objective and Conclusion 
This objective aimed to formulate corporate governance practices and policies and the 
standards to be observed by a director who is a representative of a BEE shareholder in the 
performance of his duties to the company. The primary question to establish is whether 
BEE representative directors are accountable to the company and other shareholders. 
 
6.6.2 Conclusion on Literature Review 
The review of the literature revealed that our laws and policies prescribe the following 
corporate governance practices and policies applicable to BEE representative directors: 
 
Every director of a company, as part of the company’s board of directors, is part of a 
crucial component of a company. Directors undertake the management of the company 
and act on behalf of the company in dealings with external third parties to the company. 
These functions are performed on behalf of the company. Decisions taken by the board of 
directors are considered to be decisions of the company. 
 
South African laws impose certain duties on directors by virtue of their being directors of 
a company for the purpose of ensuring that these directors discharge their duties to the 
company accordingly. A shareholder, creditor or stakeholder with substantial interests in 
the company may commonly have the right to appoint directors to the board of a 
company. In the case of BEE, BEE shareholders are sometimes given the right to appoint 
directors to the board, and these directors are considered to be representative of the BEE 
shareholder to the board of the company. 
 
These BEE representative directors are directors like any other directors of the company. 
Like any other director they are subjected to the same principles and standards. They owe 
a fiduciary duty to the company to always act in the best interests of the company. They 
are obliged to prioritise the interests of the company above all other interests, including 
those of the majority shareholder and the BEE shareholder who appointed them.  
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What they should take into account when they are attempting to establish the best 
interests of the company is dependent upon company policy, and in the absence of any 
clear company prescriptions in this regard such a decision becomes a matter of personal 
orientation. When discharging their duties to the company, these directors like any other 
director, are at liberty to elect the approach they believe is in the best interests of the 
company.  
 
They can take into account the interest of all the relevant stakeholders they believe have a 
bearing on the long-term sustainability of the company. The emphasis they place on the 
consideration of the interests of  a particular stakeholder or shareholder is also a matter of 
personal orientation as long as at all times they act in a manner they bona fide believe is 
in the best interests of the company.  
 
The fact that some of these BEE representative directors can be members of the BEE 
shareholder group does not render every decision that these directors make to benefit the 
BEE shareholder they represent automatically reviewable. Such decisions are only 
reviewable in the event of that director’s decision benefitting the BEE shareholder they 
represent at the expense of the other shareholders.  
 
BEE representative directors are not obliged by law to account to the BEE shareholder 
who appointed them. Any obligations on the BEE representative director to account to 
the BEE shareholder would be self-imposed by the director or a contractual obligation. 
Any such obligation would be enforceable only to the extent that it does not contravene 
any applicable laws.  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 stipulates that any information that the director learns by 
virtue of him being a director should only be used for the benefit of the company and 
should not be shared with third parties. Even though the BEE shareholder is a member of 
the company, such information that the director has learned can only be shared with the 
BEE shareholder in a manner that is consistent with how information is shared by the 
board with other shareholders or any other party.   
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BEE shareholders are not allowed to dictate to the director who represents them how that 
director should discharge his duties and how to vote, as directors are required to exercise 
their unfettered discretion to bring about the best interests of the company. A BEE 
representative director can consult and note the opinions of the BEE shareholder on a 
particular as a matter of reference but only in a manner that is in accordance with the law 
and company policy.  Any attempt by representative directors to bind themselves into 
being compelled to vote or exercise their duties in a particular way amounts to a breach 
of those directors’ fiduciary duties.  Such agreements are not enforceable by law because 
to do so would amount to compelling those directors to breach their fiduciary duties to 
the company and not to exercise their unfettered discretion.  
 
In the event of a BEE representative director being instructed how to perform his/her 
duties to the company by the BEE shareholders, with a possibility of some sanction being 
imposed upon the director should he/she fail to comply with that instruction, that director 
has conflict of interests at that point. If the sanction that might be imposed on that 
director is likened to a BEE representative director being replaced as director, that 
director would have personal financial interests in that matter which should be acted 
upon. He/she would stand to lose financially should he/she be replaced, and according to 
the Companies Act that director should declare those personal financial interests to the 
board and follow the recommendations of the board on any future participation on that 
issue. 
 
BEE shareholders are not allowed to interfere with the manner in which the BEE 
representative director they appointed performs his/her duties as a director.  BEE 
representative directors are not agents of the BEE shareholder who appointed them to the 
company’s board. These directors are only representatives of the BEE shareholder in the 
form of representing the ideology and perspective of the members of that BEE 
shareholder group and not are there to act on behalf of that BEE shareholder. When the 
BEE shareholder is afforded the right to appoint a director to the board, that shareholder 
is afforded the right to appoint a director they believe can identify with their needs and 
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would be more inclined to bring about the objectives that BEE shareholder is aiming to 
achieve. BEE shareholders should exercise better care when appointing representative 
directors in order to avoid complications. 
 
6.6.3 Conclusion on Findings of Objective Five 
A total of 58.3% of the respondents disagreed with the suggestion that BEE directors 
should exclusively account to the BEE shareholder they represent. This showed that the 
respondents were consistent on the point that directors, including BEE representative 
directors, should prioritise the best interests of the company at all times even though a 
slight majority agreed that BEE shareholders should be able to dictate to their 
representative directors on how they must discharge their duties. However, 61% of the 
respondents believed that a BEE director is accountable to the BEE shareholders. This 
notion was also shared by 40% of the respondents representing Companies Issuing 
shares.  
 
From the above, a clear disparity can be identified as a majority of the respondents 
believed that unlike other directors, BEE representative directors are accountable to the 
BEE shareholder they represent and that BEE shareholder is entitled to instruct how that 
BEE representative director should discharge his duties as a director. These are 
inconsistent with the prescriptions of law and recommendations have been made below as 
to how to address this issue.   
 
 6.7 Recommendations 
The following recommendations were reached based on the outcomes of this research 
study: 
 
1. Companies need to develop a culture of stakeholder participation as a 
norm when dealing with BEE. In circumstances whereby a company 
stakeholder becomes a shareholder like in the case of the Bizana 
community and Transun (Pty) Ltd, community participation would allow 
the company to address the problems revealed by this study. It would 
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allow the stakeholder a platform to address issues directly with the 
company and not isolate the BEE representative director. This practice 
would also allow the company to continuously monitor prevailing 
sentiments within that stakeholder. The most important consequence 
would be that the stakeholder would be part of the decision making 
process and would understand why a particular decision was taken as 
opposed to focusing on the BEE representative director. 
 
2.  Companies need to invest in skills development of their directors. This 
would assist those directors that are not fully informed of their duties to 
the company. Also this would assist BEE representative directors to fully 
understand the nature of their duties to the company and how to best deal 
with conflicts that might arise. 
 
3. There might be a need for the development of a regulated director 
accreditation system. Currently there is no director accreditation system 
that is regulated, uniform and applicable nationally. The study revealed 
that some directors were not informed of their duties. The concern is that 
currently there are no requirements or any qualifications that are required 
in order for a person to qualify as a director. The Companies Act only 
prescribes in a broad sense that a person must have the necessary skills to 
perform their duties as a director; 
 
4.           When concluding a BEE transaction, companies should consider 
sponsoring consultants or legal advisors to advise the potential BEE 
shareholder on the prescriptions of the law and what the transaction they 
are about to enter into entails. Agreements should be used to address the 
problems that arise, or have the potential of arising, after the agreement 
has been concluded. These can include an undertaking by the BEE 
shareholder not to interfere with the representative director’s ability to 
perform his/her duties. Another example would for the appointment of the 
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BEE representative director being for fixed periods and replacement of 
directors being subject to approval by the board of directors of the 
company. 
 
 6.8 Limitation of the Study 
One of the limitations of the study was that due to the constraints, the sampling method 
utilised was accidental or availability sampling. The first limitation was that the sample 
was not reflective of the population of directors and shareholders in business in South 
Africa, and making generalising the findings of this study impossible. 
 
6.9     Recommendation for Future Studies 
This study revealed that some directors were not well-informed of the duties and    
obligations imposed upon them by law. The extent of the problem was not clear from this 
study, but what was clear was that this problem did exist. A further study in this regard 
should be commissioned to better understand the problem and hopefully 
recommendations can be made as to how to best address it.  
 
Given the limitations of this study, a further study on a better representative sample 
should be conducted. Hopefully that would lead to a better understanding of the nature 
and extent of the problem regarding the Autonomy of directors that represent BEE 
shareholders. A better understanding would be used to assist for better remedial 
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Appendix 1   Questionnaire 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
 
MBA Research Project 
Researcher: Sibusiso Ntshebe 0312018968 
Supervisor: Alec Bozas 082 33 444 77 
 
The Autonomy of Directors of Black Economic Empowerment Companies 
 
 
The purpose of this survey is to solicit information from company investors, company directors 
and other stakeholders regarding their expectations and understanding as to the nature and extent 
of the duties imposed on directors that are representatives of B.E.E. shareholders that are minority 
shareholders. The information and ratings you provide us will go a long way in helping us better 
understand South Africa’s corporate governance standards. The questionnaire should only take 
you about 30 minutes to complete. In this questionnaire, you are asked to indicate what is true for 
you, so there are no “right” or “wrong” answers to any question. If you wish to make a comment 
please write it directly on the booklet itself. Please do not omit any questions. Thank you for 
participating. 
 
Please mark your choice by an “X”  
 
PART 1: Background Information 
 
1. Your age-group is <  21    22 - 32    33 - 43    44 - 54     55+     years. 
 
2. Are you male _______  or female________? 
 
3. Race  African   White   Indian  Coloured  Other Specify ___________________ 
 
4. What is your highest academic/professional qualification?  Below Matric  Matric  
PostMatric Cert  Degree  PGDegree/Diploma   Other, specify 
 
5. What is your occupation? ___________________________ 
 
 110 
6. For how many years have you been at this profession?  <  1  1 - 5  6 -10  11-15  15+ 
years.  
 
7. In what capacity have you been in business Employee  Shareholder  Financer 
 Executive Director Non-Executive Director 
 
8. For how many years has this relationship been in existence?  <  1  1 - 5  6 -10   
11-15  16+ years. 
 
9. Have you been involved with a company that concluded a B.E.E. Transaction? YES  
NO  
 
10. Was the company referred to in 9 above a wholly owned subsidiary of another 
company?    Yes   N0 
 
11. Were you involved with that company that concluded a B.E.E. Transaction before 
that transaction? YES  NO 
 
12. In a B.E.E. Transaction, you would describe your role as being a 




PART 2:  
 
1. In his/her decision making process, a director should always strive to achieve what is 
in the best interest of the company  
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 













2.  In his/her decision making process, a director should always consider what is in the 










Somewhat Agree  
 











3. In his/her decision making process, there instances where a director can consider what 
is in the best interest of the company as being separate from what is in the best interest of 
the majority of shareholders 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 












4. The best interest of the company should always be defined according to what is in the 
best interest of the majority of shareholders 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










5. The best interest of the majority of shareholders should always be 
defined by what is in the best interest of the company. 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










6. In his/her decision making process, a director should always strive to achieve what is 
in the best interest of the majority of shareholders  
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










7. In his/her decision making process, a director should always strive to achieve what is 
in the best interest of the company even if it is at the expense of minority shareholders  
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 















8. In the director’s decision making process, a director is compelled to always strive to 
achieve what is in the best interest of the majority of shareholders even if it is at the 
expense of the minority shareholders 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










9. In the decision making process, a director of a company should consider, in addition to 
the interest of the majority of shareholders, the interest of B.E.E. Shareholders 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










10. In his/her decision making process, a director, should only accommodate the interest 
of minority B.E.E. Shareholders only to the extent that they are not in conflict with the 
interest of the majority of shareholders 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 












11. When making decisions as a director of a company, directors representing a B.E.E 
Shareholder should prioritise in favour of B.E.E. interests 
 
11.1 The interest of the majority of shareholders first then the interest of B.E.E 
         Shareholders. 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










11.2 The interest of the majority of shareholders and the interest of the B.E.E. 
Shareholder are to be given equal priority? 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










11.3 The interest of the B.E.E. Shareholder should get priority and then the interest of 
the majority of shareholders 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 











12. In the event of a director serving as a representative of a B.E.E. Shareholder group, 
that director should specifically limit his/her responsibility to the best interests of the 
B.E.E Shareholder s/he represents. 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










13. A director who is a representative of a B.E.E. Shareholder should prioritise decisions 
in terms of what is in the best interest of the company, even if that, is in conflict with the 
best interest of the B.E.E. Shareholders that he/she represents 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










14. The B.E.E. Shareholder should be entitled to instruct a director who is their 










Somewhat Agree  
 











15. A director who is a representative of a B.E.E. Shareholder should only consider the 
best interest of the company to the extent that what is in the best interest of the company 
is not in conflict with the best interest of the B.E.E. Shareholders that he/she represents 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










16. A director who is a representative of a B.E.E. Shareholder should exclusively account 
to the B.E.E. Shareholder that had appointed that director as its representative 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 










17. The B.E.E. Shareholder who appoints a director to represent it should be entitled to 
replace that representative director in the event of that director failing to give preference 
to the interests of that B.E.E. Shareholder 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 











18. A director who is a representative of a B.E.E. Shareholder and who fails to prioritise 
the best interest of the B.E.E. Shareholder, should be replaced by the B.E.E. Shareholder 
unless s/he can show that the decision was in the best interest of the company? 
 
 






Somewhat Agree  
 

































Thank you for your participation in this research. Rest assured that none of the comments 
made during this interview will be disclosed to any person and your identity will not be 
revealed in any way to any person. 
 
 


























Appendix 5   Change of Title Request 
 
